# PGM Neg – Compiled

### Notes

Thanks to Sam Church and Devin Lai (Aff) and Alex Huang and Eleanor Barrett (Neg) for their work on this file!

NOTES (from Alex Huang)

* Any DA or turn you go for has to be paired with a uniqueness CP – there’s a generic uniqueness CP that ends aid to Ukraine and a more specific one that’s meant to be paired with the humiliation turn
* There’s multiple ways the humiliation turn can be read
  + A. Avoids issues with uniqueness – go for any Russian defeat is bad, the aff has to bite the bullet on uniqueness because they’ve read evidence in the 1AC that Ukraine will lose now, which the aff prevents. The issue with this strategy is it gives the aff a lot more ground with “Russia invades more” – this version doesn’t need a CP
  + B. Go for “negotiated settlement good” – requires the CP, the link would be crushing defeat is bad – the aff overwhelmingly destroys Putin – causes him to lashout
  + \*\*This is a case turn – there is no unique or external offense to the turn which means it’s extremely important to win defense to the second advantage

Please email [khirn10@gmail.com](mailto:khirn10@gmail.com) with any questions or concerns

## Advantage One

### AT: Ukraine War – 1NC

#### Deterrence fails – a Russian invasion would mobilize rebel groups to have plausible deniability AND new US weapons don’t change the calculus for invasion

Charap and Boston 22 - a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corp (Samuel and Scott, “The West’s Weapons Won’t Make Any Difference to Ukraine,” *ForeignPolicy*, 1-21-22, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/21/weapons-ukraine-russia-invasion-military/>, Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)

With Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the policy discussion in Washington increasingly has focused on what the United States can do to help its Ukrainian partners defend their country. Just this week, the Biden administration has approved deliveries of U.S.-made Stinger shoulder- launched anti-aircraft missiles to Kyiv, in addition to upping provision of other military equipment. Allies, including the United Kingdom, are providing their own assistance, too. The justification for the aid has varied. Some have made the case that U.S. military assistance to Ukraine can change Russia’s calculus now, possibly deterring Moscow from launching an attack. Others claim that aid to the Ukrainian military can have a real impact on a possible fight with the Russians, making it meaningfully more challenging for the Kremlin to achieve victory and ruling out certain military options Russia might be considering. And there are also voices who call for additional capabilities merely to raise costs for Moscow—that is, to kill more Russian soldiers—so as to create political problems for President Vladimir Putin at home, although without much expectation that Ukraine would prevail. **None of these arguments is convincing**. That does not mean security cooperation with Kyiv should cease. It does mean that military assistance is not an effective lever for resolving this crisis. Since 2014, the United States has provided over $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine, following the Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbass. U.S. assistance to Ukraine has included the provision of trainers, selected defensive systems (such as counter-mortar radars), and, more recently, Javelin anti-tank missiles. This assistance has principally aimed to improve Ukrainian effectiveness in the relatively static conflict against Russian-backed separatist forces in the Donbass, who are mainly armed with small arms and light weapons, along with some artillery and Soviet-era armor. Crucially, however, Ukraine has mainly not been fighting Russia’s armed forces in the Donbass. Yes, Russia has armed, trained, and led the separatist forces. But even by Kyiv’s own estimates, the vast majority of rebel forces consist of locals—**not soldiers of the regular Russian military**. Indeed, the Russian armed forces engaged directly in the fighting only twice—in August-September 2014 and January-February 2015—and with limited capabilities, although both episodes ended in crushing Ukrainian defeats. Moscow has sought to retain some veil of deniability about its involvement in the conflict, which meant the Russian military never used more than a tiny fraction of its capabilities against the Ukrainians. It applied just enough force to get the job done while avoiding protracted, overt interventions. A wide variety of signature Russian capabilities—including its air force and ballistic and cruise missiles—**have not been involved in the fighting at all,** even as they have been repeatedly demonstrated in combat operations in Syria. The nature of the reported Russian buildup suggests the expanded war, if it happens, will differ fundamentally from the past seven years of simmering stalemate. Russia has the ability to carry out a large-scale joint offensive operation involving tens of thousands of personnel, thousands of armored vehicles, and hundreds of combat aircraft. It would likely begin with devastating air and missile strikes from land, air, and naval forces, striking deep into Ukraine to attack headquarters, airfields, and logistics points. Ukrainian forces would begin the conflict nearly surrounded from the very start, with Russian forces arrayed along the eastern border, naval and amphibious forces threatening from the Black Sea in the south, and the potential (increasingly real) for additional Russian forces to deploy into Belarus and threaten from the north, where the border is less than 65 miles from Kyiv itself. In short, this war will look nothing like the status quo ante of conflict in Ukraine, and **that undermines the first justification for U.S. aid: deterring Russia.** The Ukrainian military has been shaped to fight the conflict in the Donbass and thus poses little deterrent threat to Russia; **provision of U.S. weapons can do nothing to change that**. If Moscow is willing to launch a major war, invading the second-largest country in Europe with a population of over 40 million, all while absorbing tremendous economic punishment from the West, then it is unlikely to be deterred by whatever U.S. military assistance can be delivered in the coming weeks. The only weapons systems that could plausibly impose costs that could change Russia’s calculus, such as surface-to- air missiles and combat aircraft, are ones that the United States would be highly unlikely to provide the Ukrainians. And, regardless, they could not be procured, delivered, and be made operational—to say nothing of getting the Ukrainian operators trained up to use them—in time to have an impact on this crisis. Large, modern systems require extensive training and material support.

### AT: Ukraine War – 2NC

#### Ukraine is terminally screwed – Russian forces outclass Ukraine on all levels even with new military tech

Charap and Boston 22 - a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corp (Samuel and Scott, “The West’s Weapons Won’t Make Any Difference to Ukraine,” *ForeignPolicy*, 1-21-22, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/21/weapons-ukraine-russia-invasion-military/>, Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)

Once deterrence fails and a war begins, the Ukrainian armed forces will find themselves in desperate circumstances almost immediately. Ukraine **does not have anywhere near enough forces to credibly defend against all the potential avenues of attack**, which means it would have to choose between defending a select set of fixed strong points—ceding control of other areas—or maneuvering to engage Russian forces that outnumber them. The line of conflict in the Donbass will be but one of many fronts. The Ukrainian fortifications there may well look like a modern-day Maginot Line: prepared for a frontal attack that may never come and bypassed by the mobile forces of an adversary with more advanced aircraft and more mobile land forces. Ukraine’s great size means that the land forces operating there will be required to move to cover large areas of rural terrain. Mobile engagements would benefit Russian forces, which are far better trained and equipped to conduct coordinated air and land maneuver warfare than their Ukrainian opponents. The Russian military has repeatedly practiced the use of long-range strike and tactical fires cued by drones as well as other means of reconnaissance, both in training and in combat operations in Syria. Russia’s combat aircraft and strategic air defenses give Moscow many more options to control the air and to strike Ukrainian forces, and most Russian pilots have recent real-world experience in Syria. The Ukrainian military also largely operates legacy Soviet weapons; Russian forces have a **deep familiarity with the limitations of these systems** and know what tactics to employ to further reduce their effectiveness. In short, the military balance between Russia and Ukraine is so lopsided in Moscow’s favor that **any assistance Washington might provide in coming weeks would be largely irrelevant in determining the outcome of a conflict should it begin**. Russia’s advantages in capacity, capability, and geography combine to pose insurmountable challenges for Ukrainian forces tasked with defending their country. The second argument for aid—changing the course of the war— thus does not hold water.

#### Continued militarization spurs aggressive Russian response – turns the aff

Menon 22 - Director of the Grand Strategy Program at Defense Priorities and Senior Research Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University

Hence their confidence that more Javelins will improve Ukraine’s ability to destroy Russia’s tanks, that additional Stinger anti-aircraft missiles will cause even more Russian warplanes to fall from the skies, and that counter-battery radars will locate and demolish deadly Russian artillery. Yet amid the moral outrage and depth of animosity toward Putin, the risks of pouring arms into Ukraine should be considered carefully and dispassionately. Providing Ukraine even more arms may well produce the results its proponents anticipate. It could, on the other hand, impel Russian commanders to subject Ukrainians to even greater pain. They have already experienced enormous suffering because Russia, as the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has noted, routinely hits civilian buildings. If the war becomes even more brutal, Ukraine may keep resisting, but then the number of Ukrainians seeking refuge in other countries, now 2.6 million (the largest proportion is in Poland), will soar. With Warsaw and Kraków, its two largest cities, overwhelmed by the influx, Poland has already appealed for help. A continuing exodus from Ukraine could strain the economies and social fabric of its neighbors, especially if the war drags on, preventing refugees from returning home. Furthermore, Russia **may not stand by**, allowing the west to fortify Ukraine’s army. Putin might order his generals to bomb the supply routes from Poland and Romania, the Nato countries that have the longest borders with Ukraine. On 11 March, after not having bombed them since 24 February, the day the war started, Russian aircraft took aim at military airfields in Lutsk and Ivano-Frankivsk in western Ukraine. Lutsk lies about 60 miles from Poland’s border, in Volyn province, which adjoins it. The city of Ivano-Frankivsk is located north of the Romania’s border, and the eponymous province of which it is part adjoins Romania. On 13 March, a barrage of Russian cruise missiles hit the Yavoriv military base, which is in Lviv province and less than 30 miles from the Polish border. These attacks are a signal from Putin that he won’t stand by while the west beefs up Ukraine’s army, which has already proved a tougher nut to crack than he anticipated, and were accompanied by the warning from the deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov warning to the United States that Russia would regard arms “convoys” into Ukraine as “legitimate targets”. The United States and its allies may face unexpected countermoves from Russia and what they do in response could widen the war if Putin, in turn, raises the stakes. If the tit-for-tat spills over into Poland or Romania, whether intentionally or not, the stage could be set for a Nato-Russia confrontation, with **nuclear weapons lurking in the background**. Some experts are confident that arming Ukraine won’t widen the war, but if they’re wrong the consequences could prove catastrophic.

### AT: Ukraine War – Won’t Escalate

#### Ukraine war won’t go nuclear – no motivation

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Russian President Vladimir Putin has, indeed, threatened escalation. This is most likely a bluff for the simple reason that Russia does not benefit from further escalation. Russian declaratory nuclear doctrine does include a concept of nuclear escalation, even in response to nonnuclear threats. This “escalate to deescalate concept,” however is designed to confront threats to Russian national security that Russia cannot defeat otherwise. It does not seem to be a doctrine of nuclear coercion to achieve positive goals. Certainly, facing a foreign invasion or a direct threat to the Putin regime, nuclear escalation seems quite possible, **but this is not the dynamic Russia faces today in Ukraine.** It is trying to secure foreign policy gains, not stave off defeat. In that context, if anything, escalation works against Russian interests because the more outside powers are drawn into the fight, the greater the likelihood that Russian forces will be not just bogged down on the ground, but obliterated. Russia simply does not have the military capacity to take on NATO. With the force Moscow has shown itself willing to commit to the conflict, **it is struggling to maintain operational capacity just facing the Ukrainians.** If any NATO country were to become involved, it would dramatically tip the balance against Russia. It may take some time for forces to be deployed and effectively used in theater, but the difference in numbers of key weapons systems would become decisive relatively quickly. As discussed earlier, Russia could escalate to nuclear weapons, of course. But to what end? Can Russia win a nuclear exchange? It is difficult to construct a plausible argument regarding that. There is no nuclear option, whether tactical or general, that provides Russia with a war-winning solution, except in the case that a Russian use of nuclear weapons induces the rest of the world to surrender to Russia’s demands. But this would be a choice, and a bad one. Instead, the United States and other European powers should make clear that any use of nuclear weapons—not just strategic weapons, but lower-yield, tactical weapons, as well—will result in prompt and overwhelming retaliation. The alternative is to hand the Russians—and potentially other states—a powerful coercive tool that can be used in virtually any context or dispute. Signaling that the threat of nuclear use, in the absence of a threat to state survival, is a viable strategy for revisionist states is to open the world to an endless cycle of nuclear blackmail. Deterrence functions in both directions. Nuclear deterrence is likely quite stable. It held for the entirety of the Cold War, even in the midst of severe crises, and has also held in South Asia despite some quite severe provocations. If true, this suggests we ought not self-deter on the assumption that the Russians would be willing to risk a nuclear exchange. They almost certainly don’t. But the risk is not zero either. For decision makers who see Ukraine as strategically unimportant or, indeed, a distraction from the more important challenge posed by China, even that level of risk might be seen as too high. As with all foreign policy and strategic debates, there is room for disagreement, but it is important to specify the arguments as clearly as possible.

### 1NC -- AT: Invasion

#### Russia won’t invade -- deterrence AND alternatives.

Majumdar 17 – Dave Majumdar, Defense Editor at The National Interest, former Legislative Fellow for US House of Representatives, American University School of International Service EPGA, citing Olya Oliker, a senior adviser and director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Vasily Kashin, a senior fellow at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, and Center for Naval Analyses research scientist Mike Kofman. [This Is What a NATO vs. Russia War over the Baltics Would Look Like, 10-24-2017, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-nato-vs-russia-war-over-the-baltics-would-look-22885?page=0%2C1]//BPS

Chances of a Russian invasion of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia appear fairly remote. Even the RAND Corporation, which has been particularly hawkish, suggests that a Russian attack on a NATO member-state is low even though the alliance faces a conventional imbalance. “Our analysis suggests that NATO’s deterrent against a conventional attack by Russia on a NATO member is currently strong,” a recent RAND report states. “While we assess that a Russian attack on NATO in the near term is highly unlikely, it also seems probable that Russia will explore other avenues to signal its displeasure with ongoing U.S. and NATO posture enhancements.”

Other analysts agree that Russia does not have any desire to invade the Baltic States, all three of which were once part of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire before it. “The Russians do not seem to have any designs on the Baltic countries,” Olya Oliker, a senior adviser and director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Center for Strategic and International Studies told the National Interest. “They are, however, increasingly aware that the United States and many of the other NATO allies think they do. While they take pains to deny this, they do see strategic advantage in keeping NATO on edge, and they are certainly not above saber rattling, including in the Baltic Sea region.”

Indeed, from the Kremlin’s perspective, there is no reason for Russia to invade those former Soviet republics. While Russia has since the days of Muscovy has had historical designs on the Baltics—which were conquered under the Russian Emperor Peter the Great during the Great Northern War that ran from 1700 to 1721—in order to secure access to the sea, the current leadership in the Kremlin hopes to build up its facilities in St. Petersburg as a substitute.

“For the past twenty years Russia has been investing billions of dollars to build new seaports near St. Petersburg, so the Estonian and Latvian seaports will not be needed any more,” Vasily Kashin, a senior fellow at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics told the National Interest. “And except from the seaports, which were necessary to export Russian commodities, there was never anything really important in these countries.”

For the Kremlin, reducing Russia’s dependency on the Baltic Sea ports is a high priority. “Replacing the Baltic States logistical capabilities with the domestic ones was really an important priority of the whole Putin presidency,” Kashin said. “It does not make sense to conquer the Baltic States, after all the money was already spent on alternatives.”

Moreover, the Kremlin has limited means to attack the Baltics even if it so chose. Most of Moscow’s conventional forces are concentrated elsewhere—it would take time to amass a force capable of repelling a NATO counterattack. Meanwhile, the Kremlin does not have the option of leveraging the large ethnic Russian populations in those Baltic republics.

“‘Hybrid warfare,’ Crimea- or Donbass-style, however, can hardly be used where it is feared most: in the Baltic States and Poland,” Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote in his book Should We Fear Russia? “Moscow’s intentions aside, the local Russians’ self-identification with the Russian Federation cannot be compared to that of the Crimeans. Even though naturalization in Latvia and Estonia was made hard for local Russians, they are not looking to Moscow for protection and guidance. Daugavpils is not Donetsk-in-waiting, and Narva is no Lugansk. Poland is an even more far-fetched case. The Donbass model is not easily transferable, and employing it on the territory of a NATO member state denies the Kremlin any rationality whatsoever.”

That means that Russia would have to resort to conventional military means to invade the Baltics if Moscow were so inclined. But even there, Russia is not positioned to take such actions. The Kremlin would have to build up its forces in the region before launching an invasion, which would warn NATO of an impending strike. “There is a buildup near the Ukrainian border. If we want to invade the Baltics, there is need to relocate forces, potentially warning the enemy,” Kashin said.

Indeed, as Center for Naval Analyses research scientist Mike Kofman notes, Russian forces near the Baltics are far from Moscow’s best. “Russia’s military modernization and force structure expansion had been ignoring the Baltic region until only recently,” Kofman wrote in the Harvard University Belfer Center’s Russia Matters. “Despite provocative air and naval activity concentrated in the area, Russian forces based there are principally defensive, and aging to boot. There are indicators that a change in the size and strength of Russian forces is inevitable, but it will be gradual, in part informed by what forces NATO chooses to deploy.”

As Kofman notes, it would be possible for Russian forces to move rapidly from the Ukrainian border to the Baltic states, however an invasion would be fraught with danger for Moscow. A RAND study had posited that the Russian military could conquer all three Baltic states quickly using its conventional forces in as little as thirty-six hours, but there are flaws in the analysis. The RAND study only accounts for an initial invasion of the Baltics, it does not cover a NATO counterattack or nuclear escalation.

“Nearly two years of extensive wargaming and analysis shows that if Russia were to conduct a short-warning attack against the Baltic States, Moscow’s forces could roll to the outskirts of the Estonian capital of Tallinn and the Latvian capital of Riga in thirty-six to sixty hours. In such a scenario, the United States and its allies would not only be outranged and outgunned, but also outnumbered,” write David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson of the RAND Corporation in War on the Rocks.

Indeed, other analysts such as the Center for Naval Analyses’ Jeff Edmonds agree that Russia could likely overwhelm the Baltics with the forces they have available. “The Russians have a clear overmatch from there and can overwhelm them quickly,” Edmonds told the National Interest.

But Kofman as notes, Russia would need to size its invasion force to not only beat the local NATO forces in the Baltics but to fight the entire alliance and defeat a counter-attack. Planners in Moscow would have to account for an inevitable counter-attack by the United States and its allies, thus it would not like limit itself to an invasion force of twenty-seven combat battalions as posited by the RAND study. Nor would the Kremlin necessary only afford itself a ten-day timeframe.

#### Baltic invasion won’t go nuclear

Viljar Veebel 19. Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. 06/01/2019. “Researching Baltic Security Challenges after the Annexation of Crimea.” Journal on Baltic Security, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 41–52.

3 Studies on potential nuclear escalation scenarios

The question whether Russia would use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region has also intrigued many academics and military experts recently. One of the most radical discussions in this field is a blog post by Loren B. Thompson, ‘Why the Baltic states are where nuclear war is most likely to begin’. He argues that the likelihood of nuclear war between Russia and the United States is probably growing and is the reason why it is most likely going to start is a future military confrontation over three Baltic countries. Thompson describes eight reasons why nuclear weapons could potentially be used in future warfighting scenarios with regard to the Baltics and argues that according to the bottom-line scenario, the East–West conflict escalates into the use of nuclear weapons in the Baltic area, and neither side of the conflict understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other. Thompson comes to a somewhat surprising conclusion – at least in the eyes of the Baltic countries – that the United States needs to reassess the situation, suggesting that it would make no sense to tie security of the United States to countries of ‘such modest importance that are situated in such unpromising tactical circumstances’ (Thompson, 2016).

Potential nuclear conflict escalation scenarios are in more detail discussed in another publication, a NATO playbook entitled ‘Preventing escalation in the Baltics’ by Ulrich Kühn. The author argues that the risk of escalating a wider conflict between Russia and NATO is dangerously high particularly in the case of the Baltic countries because it would be difficult for NATO to defend the region. Kühn suggest three possible escalation scenarios, i.e., deliberate escalation, inadvertent escalation, and accidental escalation. All three scenarios also involve nuclear threats; however, two of the scenarios stop short of actual Russian nuclear-weapon usage (Kühn, 2018). The analysis provides an interesting hypothetical construct for the experts at both the transatlantic and local levels, as it points to many practical issues in regard to the nuclear deterrence from the NATO’s political decision-making process to the role of domestic policies in tackling such a crisis.

Conflict escalation scenarios that involve nuclear capabilities are discussed also in other studies. For example, in a study called ‘Reducing the risk of nuclear war in the Nordic/Baltic region’ by Barry Blechman and co-authors, two scenarios of conventional war ending in the exchange of nuclear weapons are constructed (namely, ‘Escalation in Estonia’ and ‘Regional War’). Although the authors emphasize that the scenarios are purely illustrative and the probability of nuclear use is low, they argue that it is useful to reduce these risks even further and suggest two initiatives, such as a strengthening of the Alliance’s conventional military capabilities and particularly the ability to move quickly into the Baltic region, as well as to establish a Baltic nuclear weapons free zone, or at least examining the possibility to do so (for further discussion, see Blechman et at., 2015). Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavičius in their article ‘A plausible scenario of nuclear war in Europe, and how to deter it: A perspective from Estonia’ point to various alarming signs, e.g., Russia’s large-scale exercises incorporate limited nuclear strike scenarios against NATO as part of Russia’s ‘escalation to de-escalate’ strategy; Russia is expanding the range of its tactical delivery systems, the country’s political rhetoric includes nuclear threats toward the West, and so on. They emphasize that the Alliance’s range of response options to such threats and limited nuclear war scenarios has shrunk considerably and that the Alliance lacks a collective will to call those threats a bluff (Luik and Jermalavičius, 2017).

A large part of the research in this field more or less considers it likely that Russia could use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region. However, there are also articles that oppose this conviction. For example, Viljar Veebel and Illimar Ploom in ‘The deterrence credibility of NATO and the readiness of the Baltic states to employ the deterrence instruments’ disagree with the idea that the Baltic countries could be under potential nuclear attack, which could in turn evolve to a nuclear war. They argue that although Russia and NATO as potential conflict parties have a striking capability, it would be irrational for both of them to execute a nuclear strike even as a measure of last resort. The authors stress that it is hard to believe that Russia has any rational motivation to use nuclear weapons in the Baltic countries because a large share of the population in the Baltic countries are Russian-speaking. Likewise, in case of a potential conflict, territorial proximity of Russia and the Baltic countries, as well as Russia’s possible further ambition to legitimate the annexation comes into play. The argument of irrationality applies also to the NATO alliance as it would raise a question about morality and escalation should NATO consider using nuclear attack as a preventative measure. In addition, there are several logical gaps in the chain of arguments justifying the use of nuclear weapons against Russia if the latter has fully or partially invaded the Baltic countries. The authors hereby point to the following questions: First, how could the strategic use of nuclear weapons against Russia be believable in a regional conflict? Second, how would it help to solve the conflict which has already started? Third, what would be the possible positive outcome for NATO, having initiated mutually assured destruction with Russia to stop the occupations of Baltics? (Veebel and Ploom, 2018a).

### 2NC -- AT: Invasion

#### Baltics don’t provoke Russia.

Lanoszka 20 – Alexander Lanoszka, International Relations Professor at the University of Waterloo. [Thank goodness for NATO enlargement, International Politics, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00234-8]//BPS

The defensibility of NATO’s northeastern flank

NATO enlargement has provided a key source of insurance by raising the costs of direct Russian aggression against alliance members. This is true even in arguably the weakest part of the alliance, the Baltic littoral region. Conventional wisdom holds that the defense of this region against Russian aggression is especially costly for the USA and NATO to undertake. The countries located there are exceptionally vulnerable. Whereas most beneficiaries of NATO enlargement are at least largely separated from Russia thanks to Belarus and Ukraine, the Baltic countries are directly contiguous and have only a short land connection to continental NATO by way of the Polish–Lithuanian border. According to this perspective, a rebalancing of alliance commitments in Europe is necessary because the local military balance favors Russia too much and the political will to defend the Baltic states is too low. The USA will never ‘trade Toledo for Tallinn’ (Shifrinson 2017, 111).

Note the contradiction: According to critics, enlarging NATO simultaneously provokes Russia and weakens the alliance. But what rational cause would Russia have to be dismayed when a potentially adversarial military alliance willingly takes on major liabilities? The alliance security dilemma—whereby the strengthening of one coalition may inadvertently create insecurity for another—suggests that Russia would be justifiably concerned if NATO either incorporated states that meaningfully aggregate capabilities or increased military ties with such powerful states (Snyder 1984, 477). By NATO enlargement critics’ own admission, the Baltic countries sub-tract from, rather than add to, what the alliance can do. Russian might have reasons to protest enlargement, but these reasons likely concern the perceived slight to its honor when former Soviet states became formal defense partners of the USA (Götz 2017, 236–239).4 NATO enlargement has not been responsible for Russian authoritarianism or international revisionism because it never threatened Russia.

#### No Baltics invasion AND other areas thump.

Rostoks and Vanaga ’18 [Toms and Nora; November 2018; Senior Researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Latvia; Senior Researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, “Creating an effective deterrent against Russia in Europe: Military and Non-Military Aspects of Deterrence,” https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/baltikum/14866.pdf]

Up to now, when Russia has used force in its own territory or against other countries, it has been in the name of protecting important interests. In the case of the war in Chechnya, it was the territorial integrity of the country. Regarding Georgia and Ukraine, Russia wanted to prevent the expansion of NATO, and in Syria it was to extend help to an important ally and affirmation of Russia’s return on the world stage as a player with a global reach (Lukyanov 2016). None of this is the case with the Baltic countries. They have long since become EU and NATO member states, and it is important to remember that in international politics it is easier to prevent something from happening than to undo a done deal. With regard to the question of protecting the rights of Russian speakers, both Russia’s intentions to resolve the issue in keeping with its interests and the legitimacy of putting pressure on the Baltic countries from the point of view of the current context of international rules and regulations are doubtful. In other words, the Baltic countries are accorded such an insignificant space in Russia’s foreign policy that it is difficult to imagine a reason that would be important enough to use military force against them. Since the results of using force usually come at a cost, it is difficult to find arguments for launching such an aggression, for the gains would be unlikely to counterbalance the costs. Authors who have been writing about Russian foreign policy and have tried to explain it in recent years are therefore quite certain that the Baltic countries have little reason to be concerned about their security. Dmitry Trenin writes that ‘Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are safe, however, even if they do not feel that way: the Kremlin has no interest in risking nuclear war by attacking a NATO member state, and the sphere of Russian control to which Putin aspires certainly excludes these countries’ (Trenin 2016, 29). Stephen Kotkin is of a similar opinion: he thinks that Russia’s interest in its sphere of infl uence in the post-Soviet space does not include the Baltic countries (Kotkin 2016, 8). Researchers are not always right, yet in this case their opinions clearly point to Russia having no serious interests vis-à-vis the Baltic region. Since countries usually use force to protect important interests, the nonexistence of such interests in the Baltic region allows us to speculate that a military conflict in this region is unlikely. Russia is deterred by its lack of significant interests in the Baltic region. Before we analyse other elements of deterrence it is worth looking at one argument in favour of Russia’s threat to the Baltic countries turning out to be rather important after all. The idea is that Russia may want to do to the West what it experienced at the beginning of the 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union turned the hitherto bipolar world into a unipolar one. In the current situation, where Europe has become bipolar, Russia may attempt to split the NATO alliance, thus becoming the ruling country in the European security system and reclaiming its sphere of infl uence that was lost when the USSR collapsed. In this scenario the Baltic countries would be accorded an important role, whereas Russian actions would be based on the assumption that NATO is nothing but a ‘paper tiger’, i.e. it looks dangerous but will collapse like a house of cards if Russia is to act quickly and decisively. Russia might try to split NATO if it were to assume that the military preparations of alliance members is inadequate to extend a helping hand if one were needed by one or more member states. In such a case an attack on the Baltic countries would exacerbate the existing disagreements among NATO members, cause lack of unanimity, delay decision making and make timely arrival of help impossible. Russia would thus kill two birds with one stone: it would destroy NATO (for there would be no point in its existence if the members cannot help each other when facing dangerous threats) and reclaim the Baltic countries, which were lost with the collapse of the USSR. NATO would cease to exist because for the fi rst time in its history, as a member faced an existential threat, the alliance would prove ineffective and incapable of providing the necessary help. The other member states would conclude that there is no point to NATO and consequently NATO would cease to exist. On the one hand, such an argument seems convincing, because the essence of defensive alliances is to make a positive contribution to the security of member states. If it’s not done, then other countries have to reckon with the possibility that they will not receive help if the need arises. By joining an alliance, countries have made the decision that they will generate only a part of the necessary military capability because the other members will take care of the rest. If other allies cannot be trusted, then the point of the existence of the alliance is lost and countries must generate the lacking military capability themselves or change their relationship to the adversary, i.e., bandwagon with the source of threat. Mutual distrust and differing interests can thus bring the alliance to collapse. On the other hand, the argument that alliances unravel when facing decisive action on the part of the adversary does not seem convincing. Aggressive behaviour by the adversary undoubtedly increases the feeling of threat, thus it is equally possible that countries will try to deepen their cooperation when external threat is on the rise. With the level of threat rising in the international system, countries will try to find collective solutions. Under such circumstances, cooperation will be possible not only among countries which are already on friendly terms, but also countries whose relations have been neutral or even hostile. The alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States (and Great Britain) during the Second World War is evidence that, when facing an external threat, cooperation between countries increases and not vice versa. Thus Russia has to realize that in case it engages in military aggression against the Baltic countries, the threat it represents will only act to consolidate the ranks of the NATO member states and heighten US interest in strengthening European security. NATO has taken steps to deepen the cooperation, both after the Russian-Georgian war and after Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, supporting the argument that the increase in the intensity of external threat causes balancing attempts on the part of the countries under threat (Walt 1990). It can be concluded that the possibility of military aggression on the part of Russia is diminished both by its lack of interest in the Baltic countries and by its disinclination to consolidate NATO even more by launching an aggression against one of the alliance members.

#### Baltic invasion won’t go nuclear

Viljar Veebel 19. Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. 06/01/2019. “Researching Baltic Security Challenges after the Annexation of Crimea.” Journal on Baltic Security, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 41–52.

3 Studies on potential nuclear escalation scenarios

The question whether Russia would use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region has also intrigued many academics and military experts recently. One of the most radical discussions in this field is a blog post by Loren B. Thompson, ‘Why the Baltic states are where nuclear war is most likely to begin’. He argues that the likelihood of nuclear war between Russia and the United States is probably growing and is the reason why it is most likely going to start is a future military confrontation over three Baltic countries. Thompson describes eight reasons why nuclear weapons could potentially be used in future warfighting scenarios with regard to the Baltics and argues that according to the bottom-line scenario, the East–West conflict escalates into the use of nuclear weapons in the Baltic area, and neither side of the conflict understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other. Thompson comes to a somewhat surprising conclusion – at least in the eyes of the Baltic countries – that the United States needs to reassess the situation, suggesting that it would make no sense to tie security of the United States to countries of ‘such modest importance that are situated in such unpromising tactical circumstances’ (Thompson, 2016).

Potential nuclear conflict escalation scenarios are in more detail discussed in another publication, a NATO playbook entitled ‘Preventing escalation in the Baltics’ by Ulrich Kühn. The author argues that the risk of escalating a wider conflict between Russia and NATO is dangerously high particularly in the case of the Baltic countries because it would be difficult for NATO to defend the region. Kühn suggest three possible escalation scenarios, i.e., deliberate escalation, inadvertent escalation, and accidental escalation. All three scenarios also involve nuclear threats; however, two of the scenarios stop short of actual Russian nuclear-weapon usage (Kühn, 2018). The analysis provides an interesting hypothetical construct for the experts at both the transatlantic and local levels, as it points to many practical issues in regard to the nuclear deterrence from the NATO’s political decision-making process to the role of domestic policies in tackling such a crisis.

Conflict escalation scenarios that involve nuclear capabilities are discussed also in other studies. For example, in a study called ‘Reducing the risk of nuclear war in the Nordic/Baltic region’ by Barry Blechman and co-authors, two scenarios of conventional war ending in the exchange of nuclear weapons are constructed (namely, ‘Escalation in Estonia’ and ‘Regional War’). Although the authors emphasize that the scenarios are purely illustrative and the probability of nuclear use is low, they argue that it is useful to reduce these risks even further and suggest two initiatives, such as a strengthening of the Alliance’s conventional military capabilities and particularly the ability to move quickly into the Baltic region, as well as to establish a Baltic nuclear weapons free zone, or at least examining the possibility to do so (for further discussion, see Blechman et at., 2015). Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavičius in their article ‘A plausible scenario of nuclear war in Europe, and how to deter it: A perspective from Estonia’ point to various alarming signs, e.g., Russia’s large-scale exercises incorporate limited nuclear strike scenarios against NATO as part of Russia’s ‘escalation to de-escalate’ strategy; Russia is expanding the range of its tactical delivery systems, the country’s political rhetoric includes nuclear threats toward the West, and so on. They emphasize that the Alliance’s range of response options to such threats and limited nuclear war scenarios has shrunk considerably and that the Alliance lacks a collective will to call those threats a bluff (Luik and Jermalavičius, 2017).

A large part of the research in this field more or less considers it likely that Russia could use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region. However, there are also articles that oppose this conviction. For example, Viljar Veebel and Illimar Ploom in ‘The deterrence credibility of NATO and the readiness of the Baltic states to employ the deterrence instruments’ disagree with the idea that the Baltic countries could be under potential nuclear attack, which could in turn evolve to a nuclear war. They argue that although Russia and NATO as potential conflict parties have a striking capability, it would be irrational for both of them to execute a nuclear strike even as a measure of last resort. The authors stress that it is hard to believe that Russia has any rational motivation to use nuclear weapons in the Baltic countries because a large share of the population in the Baltic countries are Russian-speaking. Likewise, in case of a potential conflict, territorial proximity of Russia and the Baltic countries, as well as Russia’s possible further ambition to legitimate the annexation comes into play. The argument of irrationality applies also to the NATO alliance as it would raise a question about morality and escalation should NATO consider using nuclear attack as a preventative measure. In addition, there are several logical gaps in the chain of arguments justifying the use of nuclear weapons against Russia if the latter has fully or partially invaded the Baltic countries. The authors hereby point to the following questions: First, how could the strategic use of nuclear weapons against Russia be believable in a regional conflict? Second, how would it help to solve the conflict which has already started? Third, what would be the possible positive outcome for NATO, having initiated mutually assured destruction with Russia to stop the occupations of Baltics? (Veebel and Ploom, 2018a).

#### Russia doesn’t plan an invasion now.

Frederick et al. 17 – Bryan Frederick, Political Science PhD from Johns Hopkins University. Matthew Povlock. Stephen Watts, Government PhD from Cornell University, formerly in the State Department's Office of Policy Planning. Miranda Priebe, Political Science PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Edward Geist, History PhD from the University of North Carolina. [Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements, RAND Corporation, RR-1879-AF, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RR1879.html?adbsc=social\_20171018\_1878401&adbid=920665026620301317&adbpl=tw&adbpr=22545453]//BPS

• Limited Russian strategic interest in the Baltics. Our review of Russian documents and recent Russian strategic literature found very little discussion of the Baltic States as an important strategic area. To be sure, Russia has taken and is continuing to take limited aggressive actions toward the Baltic States through political, media, intelligence, and cyber efforts. But we could identify no serious discussion of the strategic value of retaking part or all of the Baltic States, either for their intrinsic value or as a way of weakening NATO. This lack of discussion of the Baltics was in sharp contrast to some other former Soviet states, such as Ukraine and Georgia, which represent a much greater focus. Any Russian decision to confront NATO militarily over the Baltics would not appear to come from any existing vein of Russian strategic thinking.

#### Russia won’t even chance an invasion, and only because of deterrence!

Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,” <https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/>; RP]

The Russians are Coming, the Russians are Coming

When we understand the nuclear ramifications of this entire discussion, it becomes clear how mad much of the argumentation over conventional deterrence in the Baltics truly is. There is not even a meager attempt to explain how deterrence has failed or why Russia would attack NATO, despite the fact that through most of the Cold War and into the present, deterrence has rested more on the threat of punishment. The U.S.-Russia relationship always enjoyed deterrence by punishment aplenty (no offense to AirLand warriors), through nuclear and subsequently conventional retaliation. Despite the current tensions and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there’s little to indicate that this equilibrium has been lost.

Why is it so hard for a part of the policy establishment to understand that NATO is not Ukraine? That the considerations involved in mauling a weak, unallied neighbor on one hand and taking on the world’s preeminent military power on the other are likely to be completely different? Instead of credible analysis, we have been treated to a series of ill-structured narratives that stack the Russia threat as high as necessary together with unfounded claims that deterrence has been lost. RAND’s wargamers write:

Russia today looks to its northwest and sees little between its forces and the Baltic Sea but highway and the prospect of forcing NATO into the three-sided corner described above. Our goal was to devise a posture that would present an alternative landscape.

So what’s changed in the last 16 years? If the Baltics are such low-hanging fruit, why doesn’t Putin invade? Surely it is not a love of NATO that has stayed his hand for so many years.  NATO is told that it has lost deterrence and yet some mystical force is clearly deterring Russia. Could it be U.S. treaty commitments, the same thing that deterred the Soviet Union all those years? If Russia does not take NATO guarantees seriously, and is not deterred by the risk of war with the United States, then why invade and threaten those who consider joining the alliance? There’s never been a Russian official statement to the effect that Moscow does not take U.S. treaty obligations seriously, nor a serious repositioning of Russian forces to NATO’s borders signaling any intent to invade. It is even more worrisome that no attempts are being made to intellectually link the recommendations to NATO with an analysis of Russian force posture and intent in the Baltics.

#### Their regional force posture is a joke and they’ll focus on Ukraine and Belarus instead.

Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,” <https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/>; RP]

Ironically, contrary to many of the assertions by “the Russians are coming” camp, during the period of military reforms between 2009 and 2012 the Russian military moved, [consolidated, or disbanded](http://www.cast.ru/files/book/NewArmy_sm.pdf) many of the formations in the Western Military District facing NATO’s borders. Since 2013, some of the military strength has been trickling back near Moscow, but there’s no sudden militarization on NATO’s borders. Russia announced the creation of the 1st Tank Army [outside Moscow](https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/tag/1st-tank-army/), though the unit has yet to form, and like NATO’s very high readiness task force, is aspirationally named. Since 2014, Russia’s General Staff has focused on preparing for another possible war with Ukraine and a color revolution in Belarus, and still lacks permanently stationed units on either country’s borders. Russia’s Minister of Defense has announced the formation of three new divisions ([these were already announced piecemeal](https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/) over the past two years). Two will be [positioned](http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/01/13/623777-granitsu-prikroyut) on Ukraine’s eastern most borders, and one between Ukraine and Belarus. We can discern in Russian force posture and organization where Moscow sees the need for permanently based forces, a division level command staff, and the ability to attack on short notice. It’s Ukraine, not NATO. In essence, these will be expanded brigades formed from existing units with division-level command staffs. While NATO has Russia on its mind, Moscow is instead thinking about contingencies in Ukraine and Belarus.

This is one of the clearest examples where the “more deterrence” arguments seem factually divorced from changes in Russian force posture and perhaps the Russian military analysis community as a whole.  While the field of Russian military analysis is busily studying the layout of Russian forces and their capabilities, large parts of the policy community are akin to a plane flying above it, detached and unencumbered by the facts on the ground. Yes, Russia’s brigades can generate battalions to invade the Baltics, but everything about Russia’s force posture indicates a country ill-prepared for war with NATO. The reserve and mobilization system has been [broken](http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/can-russia-scrap-the-draft/525849.html) ever since the military reforms launched in 2008. The Russian army is simply not setup to occupy an invaded country, particularly one likely to resist. There are few permanent units based on NATO’s borders and no higher tier command structures to organize a fight using units pieced together from other districts.

#### Empirically disproven.

Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,” <https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/>; RP]

Yet much of this discussion, [like most conversations regarding Russia](http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-seven-deadly-sins-of-russia-analysis/), strikes me as conventional wisdom. Frankly, it’s much easier to adjust the narrative on the Russian threat for a policy prescription than it is to determine the right U.S. force posture to address the Russian threat. When did NATO lose its deterrence, and if it’s gone, why have the Russians not invaded all these years? These mysteries suggest there are still large blind spots in the “reinforce deterrence” debate. The reason is that these arguments rest on a contrived vision of Russia and one version of a high-end fight in the Baltics.

#### They won’t invade and it would fail.

Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,” <https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/>; RP]

Between February and April 2014, the Russian General Staff demonstrated its competence in deploying a force of roughly [40,000 to 50,000](https://rusi.org/system/files/UKRANIANMILITARYDISPOSITIONS_RUSIBRIEFING.pdf) on Ukraine’s borders and dispersing it over the course of several weeks. There are lessons to be learned from the Russian war in Ukraine, but we should take great care in extrapolating them to a hypothetical high-end fight in the Baltics between Russia and NATO. In contrast to Ukraine, it is unlikely that Russia would invade NATO as a response to an unexpected contingency with little more than an ad hoc grouping of battalion tactical groups. It is equally unlikely that an ad hoc grouping of Russian battalions — the army RAND built — would easily invade and occupy the Baltics, which have been working quite hard on conscription and mobilization to make themselves difficult to digest in such a scenario.

### 2NC -- AT: Invasion (Narva)

#### No Russian invasion

Coffey 2015 - research fellow specialising in transatlantic and Eurasian security   
Luke, "Why Narva is probably not next on Russia’s list," Apr 20, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/4/20/why-narva-is-probably-not-next-on-russias-list/

While Narva might look like low hanging fruit for Russia, there are four very good reasons why it will probably not be the next place for a Russian invasion.

Out of the three so-called “Baltic Tigers”, Estonia is the economic leader. The country bucked the trend of economic decline in the eurozone during the recent financial crisis. Estonia ranked eighth in the world for economic freedom in the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal’s 2015 Index of Economic Freedom. The country oozes with enterprise and creativity – it is, after all, the birthplace of Skype. It is true that ethnic Russians living in Estonia do not do as well economically as their ethnic Estonian counterparts, but the gap is slowing closing.

More importantly, Ethnic Russians living in Estonia are far better than their counterparts across the border in Russia. The proof is in the pudding: Over the last two-year period for which statistics are available, only 37 ethnic Russians moved from Estonia to the Motherland. Ethnic Russians in Estonia do not want to live in Russia.

When commentators say that the ‘Baltics are next’ for Russian aggression, what this really means is that NATO is next.

Cheered US troops

When Estonia held its annual military parade in Narva this year (the third time it has been held in Narva) to mark its Independence Day, the Estonian military was joined by more than 100 soldiers from other NATO countries – including soldiers and armoured vehicles from the US army’s Second Cavalry Regiment.

How did the Russian speaking population respond?

Instead of throwing tomatoes at US soldiers, Estonians were taking selfies with them. Instead of waving Russian flags, the Estonian flag flew proudly. The crowd cheered. Sure, there were some locals who did not like the parade, but this would also be the case for a military parade held anywhere in the US too.

In January, the Russian backed separatists occupying the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk sent a letter to the 13 twin and 10 partner cities of Donetsk – Narva is one of them. The letter asked Narva to provide support to the separatists’ government, and even implicitly suggested that Narvians should rise up against the West out of solidarity.

This was firmly rejected by Narva. City officials said that the partnership agreement was signed with the Donetsk city of Ukraine, and not the Russian backed so-called Peoples Republic of Donetsk. There was no appetite among Narvians to support the rogue regime that is today occupying the city of Donetsk.

Estonian troops parade in Narva to mark Estonia’s Independence Day [AP]

The NATO guarantee

Perhaps the main reason why Narva is unlikely to be invaded by Russia is NATO’s mutual security guarantee: An attack on one is an attack on all. When commentators say that the “Baltics are next” for Russian aggression, what this really means is that NATO is next.

In the eyes of NATO, the defence of Narva is as important as the defence of New York City.

So far it appears that Russia understands this. So instead of traditional warfare, or an invasion of the Baltic states, Moscow will test NATO using non-traditional military and security operations – such has cyber-attacks, propaganda, abductions, funding of political parties and pro-Russia NGOs in NATO countries. These acts have become the norm for Russia in Eastern Europe because Moscow knows that NATO is ill-prepared to deal with these sorts of threats.

Russian speakers know they have it better in Estonia than they would in Russia – and they want to keep it that way.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, nothing can be ruled out. For now, the Baltics should expect more of Moscow’s non-traditional methods of warfare, but as things currently stand, not an outright Russian invasion.

Vladimir Putin will do what he knows he can get away with and nothing more.

### 1NC -- AT: Risk-Taking

#### Russia won’t pass redlines.

Frederick et al. 17 – Bryan Frederick, Political Science PhD from Johns Hopkins University. Matthew Povlock. Stephen Watts, Government PhD from Cornell University, formerly in the State Department's Office of Policy Planning. Miranda Priebe, Political Science PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Edward Geist, History PhD from the University of North Carolina. [Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements, RAND Corporation, RR-1879-AF, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RR1879.html?adbsc=social\_20171018\_1878401&adbid=920665026620301317&adbpl=tw&adbpr=22545453]//BPS

Furthermore, there is currently little evidence that Russia is interested in a direct military conflict with the United States. Russia does not appear to count any current NATO territory, including the Baltic States, within the sphere where it is willing to use force to preserve its influence. Although Russia has used military force in post-Soviet states over the past two decades and has conducted numerous lower-level provocations involving NATO allies (including limited cyber attacks), it has taken no actions that approach announced U.S. or NATO redlines for invoking Article 5. Moreover, in the operations that Russia has undertaken, such as in Ukraine, Russia’s behavior appears to have been highly sensitive to military costs. A direct attack on a NATO member in response to posture enhancements currently in progress would represent a level of cost and risk acceptance that has no precedence in prior Russian behavior. Further enhancements could send a stronger signal of U.S. and NATO willingness to defend Alliance members and could alter Russian calculations regarding what immediate military aims it could achieve through aggression, but under current strategic and Russian domestic conditions, such benefits are likely to be marginal.

### 2NC -- AT: Risk-Taking

#### Russia is cost-averse.

Frederick et al. 17 – Bryan Frederick, Political Science PhD from Johns Hopkins University. Matthew Povlock. Stephen Watts, Government PhD from Cornell University, formerly in the State Department's Office of Policy Planning. Miranda Priebe, Political Science PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Edward Geist, History PhD from the University of North Carolina. [Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements, RAND Corporation, RR-1879-AF, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RR1879.html?adbsc=social\_20171018\_1878401&adbid=920665026620301317&adbpl=tw&adbpr=22545453]//BPS

• Cost sensitivity of current Russian leadership. Although Russian actions since 2014, and arguably since 2008, have shown an increasing willingness to take calculated risks to achieve strategic goals, these actions have all had very limited military costs. Russian campaigns in Ukraine and Syria exceeded in scope what most analysts would previously have considered likely, but they have remained militarily limited affairs and have targeted adversaries with capabilities clearly inferior to Russia’s. Indeed, Russian assistance to rebels in eastern Ukraine appears to have been gradually calibrated to give enough assistance to stave off defeat, but little more. Where Russia has been willing to accept large costs is in the economic realm, where Western sanctions have limited Moscow’s ability to cope with and respond to the decline in the price of hydrocarbons, harming the Russian economy. Militarily, however, Russia has yet to risk substantial resources in any of its aggressive actions.

### 1NC -- AT: Entrapment

#### NATO isn’t entrapping – their explanation is endogenous which means the aff could never solve

Lanoszka 17 – Alexander Lanoszka, International Relations Professor at the University of Waterloo. [Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Contemporary Security Policy, 39(2), December 2017, Taylor & Francis]//BPS

Critics charge that NATO has been reckless in its outreach to countries like Georgia and Ukraine. In so doing, it has encouraged those countries to behave more aggressive towards Russia, risking war in such a way that implicates NATO members against their own interests. The dangers of entrapment abound.

This article analyzes the different causal pathways and variables that scholars have invoked to describe how entrapment risks arise. According to the international relations literature, four broad sources of risk exist. The strength of the commitment given to the ally—actual or potential—is an institutional source. The greater the commitment, the more perverse incentives it creates for the ally to behave recklessly. System polarity and the offense-defense balance are systemic factors insofar as no one country can manipulate them. Multipolarity raises the value of allies for maintaining the balance of power, whereas the offense-defense balance affects how a defender might manage its ties with its ally. Reputational sources of risk arise when an ally exploits the defender’s interest to defend its commitments for intrinsic reasons. Finally, entrapment risks can have ideological sources: An ally strategically appeals to the ideological prejudices of its defender, thereby reshaping the defender’s own sense of strategic interests on favorable terms. Some of these arguments regarding how entrapment unfolds have already been subject to criticism on empirical and logical grounds. Besides organizing these arguments typologically, I demonstrate how uncovering clear evidence of entrapment is a difficult enterprise, even when the theories themselves seem straightforward.

The main problem concerns counterfactuals. The factors that allegedly generate entrapment risks can be so wide-ranging that imagining a world in which they operate differently would require changing other variables, which in turn can make war more or less likely. Alternatively, they might not exclude other factors that could lead to the same violent outcome. After all, conflict drives both alliance formation and the likelihood of war. States join alliances because they assess that the possibility of war is non-trivial. Similarly, a defender might be receptive to the overtures of an ally precisely because it has a pre-existing desire to see conflict with the adversary of that ally. In social scientific parlance, endogeneity problems are pervasive when trying to understand whether entrapment has occurred or is at risk of occurring. The case of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War is instructive by revealing these ambiguities. Many NATO members—especially those in Western Europe—were lukewarm towards Georgia’s bid to become a treaty ally, arguably because they recognized that Georgia posed certain entrapment risks. The United States was the most supportive of Georgia, but it might have overstated its support to Georgia in order to gain a bargaining chip with Russia. It might have even done so because Western European countries were so hesitant, thereby ignoring Saakashvili’s non-democratic tendencies. But by this very token, the United States limited its response to the outbreak of hostilities between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. The Georgian case suggests that states do not forge alliances mindlessly nor do they follow their allies off the cliff thoughtlessly. One cannot by definition want to be entrapped.

The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 illustrates the need to disentangle the factors that push states to fight wars and to seek alliances while carefully investigating the mechanisms through which alliances fuel wars. As noted, some baseline probability of war had already existed between the two former Soviet republics when Saakashvili became President. Their conflict centered on an unresolved dispute regarding the political status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Neither could commit to a durable settlement. Moreover, territorial concessions and submission to salami tactics could have signaled Georgian weakness, thereby encouraging new or more assertive territorial demands. Georgian leaders might have also faced domestic incentives to stand firm towards Russia—incentives that would have existed independent of NATO. To the extent that alliance politics mattered from Georgia’s perspective, Saakashvili might have cherry-picked information that confirmed his beliefs regarding Western support. Nevertheless, these factors are idiosyncratic because they stem directly from his personality. In a counterfactual world where NATO was not a factor, he could have had these and other cognitive biases that would have elevated the likelihood of war.

By undertaking this sort of counterfactual analysis, scholars thus must take care to isolate the effect of an alliance commitment—to the degree that it exists—from the underlying propensity of war. Georgia bears a methodological and analytical lesson for thinking about entrapment: Just because NATO was an issue for Georgian security in 2008 does not mean the alliance was causally responsible for the war. Future research on alliances and war must not only identify correlations between alliances and conflict, but also sort out various causal mechanisms that connect different causal factors with war.

Carefully disentangling the factors that could lead to entrapment matters not only for theory and methodology but also for policy. If entrapment concerns are real, then defense planners must have a clear idea as to where they come from. Some entrapment risks can be attenuated with active policy measures. Conditioning a political or military commitment when dealing with a risk-acceptant ally is one example. But doing so might not matter if we have reason to think that systemic forces make that ally more aggressive. Strong commitments could even make seemingly jumpy allies more secure. And so, armed with a better understanding of what drives entrapment risks, defense planners would be more confident in modulating political and military commitments appropriately. As such, critics of NATO expansion and American foreign policy may be overstating their case. NATO might bear some indirect responsibility for the Russo-Georgian War, but its culpability lessens when we consider the other factors that increased the likelihood of war: misperceptions, overconfidence, and the commitment problems underlying the territorial disputes themselves. If anything, the key policy challenge is for NATO to determine whether prospective partners like Saakashvili have psychological traits or cognitive biases that would make them unjustifiably optimistic about the level of support that they would receive.

### 2NC -- AT: Entrapment

#### Alliance commitments solve entrapment.

Cohen 18 – Jordan Cohen, Political Science PhD student at George Mason University. [Alliances Are a Net Gain, Not a Loss, for America, 6-28-2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/alliances-are-net-gain-not-loss-america-24562]//BPS

Furthermore, because of Washington’s dominant position in its alliance hierarchies, it can effectively restrain its allies from great conflicts. Smaller countries that do not want to increase their security risk will not engage in wars that their stronger allies wish to avoid. These small countries see a security benefit from great power alliances, and the former is subservient to the latter. For example, in Asia after World War II, Washington restrained South Korea from attacking North Korea and Taiwan from fighting China via threats to reduce American military and economic support. Moreover, the United States threatened to end its arms sales to Iran, thus forcing Tehran to avoid joining the 1973 oil embargo. Accordingly, America’s alliances provide it leverage that increases its immediate security and decrease global conflict.

#### That’s empirically and theoretically true.

Kim 11 – Tongfi Kim, Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and Centre for Governance and Public Policy. [Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States, Security Studies, 20(3), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/143890586.pdf]//BPS

This paper explains one of the central roles of alliance contracts, the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. While alliances deter aggression, they are also considered to be a contagion mechanism for war expansion.3 The existing literature on alliances argues that entrapment—“being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interest that one does not share”—is a major concern for potential and actual alliance partners.4 There is, however, little accumulation of knowledge on the phenomenon of entrapment, and contractual aspects of alliances in the current literature are reduced to the issue of commitment as a solution to the danger of abandonment, a concept often coupled with entrapment.5

Theorists as well as policy makers talk about the danger of entrapment, but strangely, it is difficult to point out clear cases of entrapment. My explanation is two-fold: First, entrapment is a narrower concept than others have realized, and it is rarer than the literature suggests. Second, leaders anticipate entrapment and either do not form alliances when it would be a problem or demand escape clauses to minimize the problem, though only to the extent that they can afford to refrain from such alliances. Several conceptual problems have made entrapment difficult to even observe. Most problematically, alliance literature currently has at least two types of entrapment – what I call entanglement and entrapment – without establishing explicit analytical criteria for the phenomenon. I argue that the literature’s use of the term “entrapment” is a mislabeling of the issue and that we need to distinguish among phenomena loosely explained by the term. The risk of entanglement (or entrapment broadly defined) is a necessary component of all military alliances, but states do not have to accept the risk of entrapment narrowly defined when entering alliances. My arguments and findings are intuitive, but they have important theoretical and policy implications on the issue of how states avoid undesirable military involvement in their allies’ conflicts. By explaining how to observe entrapment analytically, this paper also illuminates the reason why entrapment is rare and yet not an illusory concept.

I will demonstrate that states carefully design alliance agreements before and after they form alliances, and that is one of the reasons why serious military entrapment is rare.7 Alliance contracts reduce the risk of entrapment by specifying the nature of alliance obligations and conditions for their activation. This is not a new claim in the literature, but little empirical work has been done in its support.8 Indeed, 310 of 538 alliances in the ATOP dataset have one or more conditions for activation of the alliance obligations (e.g., specific adversary, specific location, non-provocation by the ally), and this paper explains when and how allies limit their alliance obligations.9 I argue that a state’s alliance obligations are more likely to be conditional when it has more fear of entrapment or more bargaining power, and I test the argument with case studies of six alliance agreements.

The empirical section of this paper examines U.S. alliance agreements with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and Spain. These cases are ideal for my purpose, because they present variations in my explanatory variables, the fear of entrapment and intra-alliance bargaining power, and also because there are diplomatic records of the alliance negotiations, with which we can directly examine the variables rather than infer them from the circumstances.10 The U.S.- ROK alliance is considered to be a typical case where a patron state fears entrapment by its client, but both conceptual and historical analyses suggest that the story is not so simple. The U.S.- Japan alliance shows that military capabilities alone do not determine the fear of entrapment; in this case, it was the client state that feared entrapment. While Japan did not have enough bargaining power at the time of the 1951 treaty, it managed to insert safeguard clauses against entrapment in the revised security treaty of 1960. Among 26 American alliances in the ATOP dataset, the first period (1963-1970) of the alliance between the United States and Spain is the only one without a condition for activation. This, I argue, is due to the low level of commitments made and the low risk of entrapment for both sides. As concerns for entrapment increased, however, the bilateral agreement was revised to include clauses against entrapment.

In the sections that follow, I first explain problems with the concept of entrapment and argue that the label of entrapment should be more narrowly applied. I then argue that states design alliance agreements in such ways that they sometimes get entangled but seldom tricked into an undesirable conflict. The case studies of the United States’ alliances with South Korea, Japan, and Spain demonstrate that concerns for entrapment and shifts in bargaining power affect the designs of alliances over time. In conclusion, I discuss the theoretical and real-world implications of this paper.

#### Entrapment is wrong – keeping conditions vaguer solves.

Rapp-Hooper 20 – Mira Rapp-Hooper, Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center. [Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, Harvard University Press, ProQuest Ebook Central]//BPS

If America’s Cold War alliances involved serious entrapment costs, the historical record would include cases in which the United States had been dragged into conflicts and crises despite having no direct stake in them. There are few such cases. American allies have proven no more likely to become engaged in conflicts with adversaries than are other states, suggesting that US security guarantees have not provoked adventurism.13

True, during the Cold War, the United States faced serious national security challenges in allied territory, including the Berlin Crisis and the Taiwan Straits Crises. But as we saw in Chapter 2, the strong US stand over Berlin was not a product of beneficent obligation to West Germany; US policymakers saw US national interests at stake. Alliance with Bonn helped to make the US commitment to West Germany more credible, but it did not entangle the country in an uninvited fracas. Likewise during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, Washington had an independent interest in averting a conflict between Taipei and Beijing; it was not simply ensnared in an ally’s woes.

The United States also entered two major wars during the Cold War, in Korea and Vietnam. But in neither case was its participation a result of alliance commitments. The United States could not have been entangled by alliance with South Korea because the two did not have an alliance during the war. The dynamic arguably was just the opposite: Washington was dragged into war because it failed to commit to Seoul in early 1950. The United States later dangled the prospect of an alliance in order to win the South’s support for an armistice. Vietnam, the most flagrant American military blunder of the Cold War, also was not provoked by alliance obligations. SEATO, the US defense pact in Southeast Asia, did not include Vietnam as a partner. Indeed, most of America’s allies opposed the US war in Vietnam, and some worried that they would be entrapped.14 South Korea and Australia did enter the fray, sending large numbers of troops to assist the United States, even though their own publics opposed the war. The United States fought in Vietnam because of its own perceived national interests and arguably paid lower, if still considerable, costs in blood and treasure than it would have if not for allies.15

In the first few years after the Cold War, the United States participated in two more major conflicts, in the Middle East and the Balkans. The Gulf War was precipitated by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, with which the United States did not have an alliance. The George H. W. Bush administration committed troops to repel a violation of the UN Charter—not because it was obligated by treaty to protect Kuwait. Alliances played a greater role in the decision to take part in conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, as the United States sought to keep the North Atlantic Treaty relevant after the Cold War. But the Clinton administration also identified humanitarian interests and aimed to establish the United States’ newfound global primacy through leadership in the Balkan conflicts. Neither Bosnia nor Kosovo were NATO members.16

Given the scholarly conventional wisdom that alliances cause entrapment, why is it so hard to find cases of American entanglement? There are several reasons. First, the United States has designed its alliances with terms that reduce its exposure to risky commitments.17 Second, when it does commit to an ally, the United States tends to construct its treaty obligations vaguely, giving itself ample room to support its allies without entering conflicts.18 And third, Washington has been selective with its alliance partners, rejecting requests for security pacts when it judges the associated commitments too dangerous.

A clear example of Washington’s care in crafting treaty language is the 1954 agreement with Taiwan. Policymakers worried that Chiang Kai-Shek would exploit a US security guarantee, shrouding himself in American protection while launching attacks on mainland China. To guard against this, the United States gave itself an escape hatch in case Taiwan used force offensively. According to language attached to the treaty, Taipei needed to get Washington’s agreement before any such use of force. That meant Chiang could not take just any aggressive action he wished and expect American support.19 The alliance treaty also deliberately excluded several islands whose status Chinese communists and nationalists disputed. The United States opted to back Chiang through tensions over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954 and 1958, but Washington was not legally obligated to act as it did. During the first crisis, the alliance was still in draft form. During the second, Washington engaged because policymakers thought it wise to deter Mao’s China. The United States was not legally compelled to take any specific action.

To the contrary, American treaty promises are designed to leave Washington with room to maneuver. Most US alliances are triggered by an “unprovoked attack” on the ally, but no language spells out what constitutes unprovoked attack. Treaties, moreover, do not indicate what the American response will be in case of attack. Recall that in 1948 NATO allies sought a treaty provision that would require the United States to automatically enter a war if Western Europe was attacked, and Washington declined. The North Atlantic Treaty and all subsequent treaties promise American consultation if allies are victims of attack, but the nature of defensive aid is not specified.

Ambiguous commitments give Washington flexibility in times of crisis. When Taiwan and China became locked in an escalating standoff in 1958, the United States made public statements on Taiwan’s behalf, moved forces into the region, and provided naval convoys for Taiwanese ships. This was a nimble response short of war, enabled by Washington’s freedom to design its action as it saw fit. In 1956 the United States used its leeway to stay out of a crisis altogether. Late that year two of the closest US allies, Britain and France, joined Israel in an invasion of Egypt. They hoped to regain the Suez Canal after Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized it. But President Eisenhower opposed the intervention. Washington felt no obligation to participate, placing the United States in fleeting alignment with the Soviet Union and against its allies for the sake of preventing escalation.20

When the risks of entrapment run high, American leaders may never ally at all. US policymakers have made careful decisions about which international partners they should support, rejecting even close friends that pose excessive danger. Israel may be the most prominent example. Though a longstanding confederate on defense and intelligence issues, Israel is not a treaty ally. This is no accident. During the Kennedy administration, Israel requested a formal security guarantee from Washington. From 1961 to 1963, US policymakers seriously considered the idea. The prospect of alliance was attractive in no small part because US officials thought they could persuade Israel to abandon its nuclear program in exchange. But while Kennedy’s team wanted very much to stop Israel from going nuclear, it felt it could not offer a guarantee without risking entrapment. A particular concern was the tension between Israel and Egypt, a country the United States did not count as an adversary. Ultimately the United States chose not to pursue the alliance. Today it is America’s Middle Eastern partners—Israel and several Arab states—that are most often accused of “reckless driving,” but none of them are treaty allies.21 Formal US allies have records of highly responsible behavior.

### 1NC – AT: Hybrid War

#### Hybrid war is meaningless and exaggerated.

Caliskan 17 – Murat Caliskan, international relations PhD Candidate at Universite Catholique de Louvain and Senior Research Fellow at Beyond the Horizon International Strategic Studies, retired in 2016 after serving more than 20 years in the Turkish Army as a military officer. [A Critique of Hybrid Warfare in the Light of Russia-Ukraine Crisis and Military Strategy, 5-27-2017, https://www.behorizon.org/a-critique-of-hybrid-warfare/]//BPS

Another flaw in the Hybrid warfare concept is that it attributes too much power to the enemy. A hybrid threat becomes an enemy almost with mystical powers (Cox et al., 2012). As it is indicated in the definition, a hybrid threat, which is a state or non-state, could employ conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal activities simultaneously, even by the same unit. This argument could be admitted for a state actor like Russia to some extent, but for non-state actors like ISIL and Hezbollah, it is hard to imagine. If they could have this ability, they would not apply suicide missions. Almost every Russian action is interpreted as part of a well-coordinated “hybrid warfare” campaign. This approach gives the Russian leadership an unrealistic degree of strategic prowess. Renz (2016) successfully points to the similarities between today and 1960s by quoting the following text from John F. Kennedy’s speech. We are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence – on intimidation instead of free choice, on guerrillas by night instead of armies by day. It is a system which has conscripted vast human and material resources into the building of a tightly knit, highly efficient machine that combines military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, scientific and political operations. (Kennedy, 1961) Bear in mind that what Kennedy implies in his speech was the Soviets. It is interesting to see the similarities of enemy’s capabilities referred such as “covert means”, “intimidation”, “combining military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, scientific and political operations”. Today’s strategic prowess, Russia is also frequently referred to have covert means and to conduct combined military and non-military operations. A deeper problem with the concept is that it is more about tactics than strategy. Strategic thinking must include not only the capabilities of forces but also the characters of forces. Professional armies do “estimate of situation” formally for over a century and it includes mission, friendly forces, terrain, weather, technologies and enemy. Estimation of just enemy includes strength, intentions, morale, technologies and tactical capabilities Strategy, as it has been already implemented by armies, should cover, at a minimum, all the factors in the “estimate of situation. “Hybrid warfare instead, focuses on just the tactical capabilities of enemy, which disconnects from the enemy itself. Within this line of thinking, so many pet theories have been crammed into the military literature that it becomes nearly impossible to make a clear strategic thinking for anybody who adheres to the concepts like hybrid warfare (Cox et al., 2012). Renz argue that hybrid warfare gained such a popularity that it became a concept counterproductive to decision making and strategic thought. It might be useful to highlight Russia’s new approach in Crimea, when compared to its less successful operations in Chechnya and Georgia, which were characterized by excessive use of force, outdated equipment and lack of coordination. However, it is not true to jump to the conclusion that Russia had found a ‘new art of war’ that made up for its shortcomings in conventional capabilities and posed a significant threat to the West. (Renz, 2016) Hybrid war term blurs the distinctions within war, but it has the fatal risk of becoming another category, as it happened by Revolution in Military Affairs, an answer rather than the basis for questions. (Strachan, 2009) Every war is unique and requires its own logic. It is impossible to conduct the same strategy at every war. If we stick to a standard description (like hybrid warfare), we might have difficulty in understanding the character of war and the potential for change as each war is waged. It would not work for Russia elsewhere to use the same strategy she used in Crimea. Echevarria resembles “hybrid warfare” to “blietzkrieg” of 1940s, a label that was never an official term in German Military Doctrine, but polished by media and commentators. In fact, what makes Germans successful in 1940s and Russians in 2014-2015 was not to create new conceptions of war, what makes them successful was conducting the main principles of war; recognizing their enemies correctly, then developing campaign plans that avoiding the strengths and exploiting the weaknesses of adversaries. (Echevarria, 2016) Although Hoffman states that his concept is consistent with the strategic theory, few analysts based their conclusions on Hoffmann’s specific understanding of the term and referred loosely to the general idea of ‘hybridity’. This resulted in widely varying understandings on what exactly hybrid warfare is. Analysts sometimes refer hybrid warfare to imply the complexity war, while sometimes just to note irregular activities in the war.

### 2NC – AT: Hybrid War

#### Statistically proven to be meaningless.

Caliskan & Cramers 18 – Murat Caliskan, international relations PhD Candidate at Universite Catholique de Louvain and Senior Research Fellow at Beyond the Horizon International Strategic Studies, retired in 2016 after serving more than 20 years in the Turkish Army as a military officer, & Paul Alexander Cramers, international security and defence Master student at Institut Libre d’Etude des Relations Internationales [What Do You Mean by “Hybrid Warfare”? A Content Analysis on the Media Coverage of Hybrid Warfare Concept, Horizon Insights, https://www.academia.edu/38008898/What\_Do\_You\_Mean\_by\_Hybrid\_Warfare\_A\_Content\_Analysis\_on\_the\_Media\_Coverage\_of\_Hybrid\_Warfare\_Concept]//BPS

The results show that in only 20 (30%) media items, the term “hybrid warfare” is used correctly and in accordance with its true definition. In other items, when the authors used the term “hybrid warfare”, they were implying other types of warfare such as “information warfare” in 18 (27%) items, “political warfare” in 14 (21%) items, “unconventional warfare” in 5 (6%) items. The results clearly demonstrate that hybrid warfare is an ambiguous concept and is not clearly understood by different stakeholders in defense community. In other words, there is not an agreed definition or understanding. Most of the time (70%), the authors imply another concept when they use hybrid warfare.10 These results suggest two potential reasons for the miscommunication. It is either because the authors have insufficient knowledge on military concepts or the concept is too weak ambiguous to explain current events that the authors imply different meanings. We believe that both options are valid. For instance, hybrid warfare is confused with political warfare in 14 media items, which is understandable as there is a similarity between two terms. Although it is author’s responsibility to know the difference between two terms, big part of the problem stems from the broadness of the term. Hybrid concept has such an inclusive definition that it allows authors to label any conflict as hybrid warfare even when the conflict in question includes only some part of the all characteristics. However, mistaking hybrid warfare for information warfare is a clear indication of the authors’ lack of knowledge on military concepts as there is a clear difference between two terms. Table 3- The Results of “author”, “media type” and “country” categories As it is shown in Table-3, there is no meaningful difference between academics and journalists in their capacity to use the term in its proper meaning. In both groups, only 29% of the population uses the term correctly, which is very close to the general average (30%). This ratio is even less in other groups, namely in experts or officials (11%-14%). Similarly, media types also do not suggest a meaningful difference in terms of correct use of the term. It is likely to infer in-depth implications if the sample size is enlarged. But current numbers do not suggest any implication. But as it stands for now, current numbers do not suggest any implication between the degree of expertise of the author and the correctness of the use of the term “hybrid warfare”.

#### Russian hybrid war is treated as a dark art, BUT it’s barely a magic trick.

Kofman 16 – Michael Kofman, an analyst at the CNA Corporation and a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, formerly Program Manager at National Defense University. [Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts, 3-11-2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/]//BPS

In trying to separate hybrid warfare from the classical bins of conventional or irregular war, I prefer to use Frank Hoffman’s definition, “a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to obtain [a group’s] political objectives.” There are other definitions out there, but you will find they are not being applied correctly to analysis of Russian tactics. Unfortunately, what Russian hybrid warfare is, and how it works, varies dramatically depending on what article, report, or PowerPoint brief you are reading. The more we have talked about it, the less we understand it as a useful concept or framework for looking at Russian actions. What’s wrong with a little hybrid warfare? If you torture hybrid warfare long enough it will tell you anything, and torture it we have. The term now covers every type of discernible Russian activity, from propaganda to conventional warfare, and most that exists in between. What exactly does Russian hybrid warfare do, and how does it work? The short answer in the Russia-watcher community is everything. The church of Russian hybrid warfare has a broad and influential following these days, but finds few worshippers among experts who study the Russian military. There’s a reason for that: Many don’t believe it exists as described. I’m not the first to point out the problems with applying this lens to Russian tactics , and I have criticized it elsewhere, but in this piece I hope to offer a fresh perspective on why the national security establishment continues to do itself a disservice by thinking about Russia through a hybrid warfare lens.

#### In fact, it failed in 2014.

Kofman 16 – Michael Kofman, an analyst at the CNA Corporation and a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, formerly Program Manager at National Defense University. [Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts, 3-11-2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/]//BPS

By August 24, the hybrid approach had demonstrably failed in the vein of previous efforts. Moscow traded it in for a conventional invasion by regular Russian units, which it had sought to avoid. The invasion in August of 2014 marked the transition to conventional war as the deciding approach, but with limited political and territorial objectives. Russian forces defeated Ukraine’s army in the field, but more importantly they demonstrated the ineffectiveness of a hybrid approach in achieving political objectives. In subsequent months, hybrid approaches did not disappear from the battlefield, but they were of little consequence compared to Russian conventional forces. If Russia doesn’t do hybrid, then what? Ukraine was decided by large-caliber artillery, MLRS systems, and tanks; not innovative hybrid approaches. Upon review, we should file Ukraine as a case study in the failure of hybrid warfare to achieve desired political ends. If it could not be accomplished there, given the country’s political and military weakness at the time, why do we think Moscow can succeed elsewhere? Is there an example of Russia using anything other than conventional war to successfully achieve its political objectives, be they in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, or Syria? The mythology of Russian hybrid warfare stands in stark contrast to the historical track record of how Russia uses military power to achieve desired political ends at home and abroad. Simply put, what Russia does best is conventional war, and if a conflict does not start that way, it is how it always ends. In analyzing the presence of hybrid approaches in this conflict, the West has broadly confused Russian activity for achievement. Let’s talk less about what Russia tries and more about how Russia wins.

### 2NC -- AT: Miscalc

#### Miscalc doesn’t go nuclear.

Tertrais 17 – Bruno Tertrais, Doctorate from the Paris Political Science Institute, Deputy Director of the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique. [“On the Brink”—Really? Revisiting Nuclear Close Calls Since 1945, The Washington Quarterly, 40(2), Taylor & Francis]//BPS

The Tradition of Non-Use Is Strong

The Cuban crisis reveals that Soviet and U.S. officials were able to refrain from foolish judgments even in conditions of extreme stress. Adversaries have never put at stake the “vital interests” of their opponents—either because they were unable to, or because they never intended to, or simply because they feared retaliation. The barriers to the use of nuclear weapons were solid, and the “tradition of non-use” emerged very quickly.

One last element of the anti-nuclear narrative deserves discussion. There is no certainty at all that any use of a nuclear weapon would turn into a major nuclear war. Yes, Cuba was a time of great danger. But why would the use of a nuclear torpedo, for instance, necessarily have led to a global thermonuclear exchange? Is it not at least equally likely that the two countries would have done their best to limit escalation? It is possible, as Herman Kahn famously argued, that “the nuclear threshold is not so weak that a single use of nuclear weapons would make anyone careless about crossing it a second time.”79

Escalation in the nuclear age would not necessarily be a descent into the abyss. It might very well be the equivalent of walking up a staircase where the last stairs are considerably higher than the first ones. Resistance to actual use or launch could increase as one moves up the escalation ladder—not unlike two magnets repelling each other.

The narrative claiming that the world has stood many times “on the brink of apocalypse,” or that we were within a “hair’s breadth” of a nuclear catastrophe, thus deserves deconstruction. It discards the strength of the technical, operational, or mental safety valves that prevent nuclear use. Stanislas Petrov, the “man who saved the world,” was not a superhero who single-handedly stopped a runaway train: he was an average Soviet official who applied procedures.

Some legitimate questions remain. What would happen if a false alarm erupted during wartime? If a full-blown conflict involving nuclear-armed countries erupted—something that has never happened, probably thanks to deterrence—can we assume that caution would still prevail? This is an important question and a legitimate preoccupation. The absence of any such conflict since 1945 suggests that nuclear deterrence is a robust construct—but no human construct is infallible. Whether it is for safety mechanisms or for deterrence, even “virtually impossible” does not mean zero. Some would argue that any probability of a nuclear war is too much. But surely this does not close the discussion: a very small probability of a deadly car accident has to be balanced against the benefits of driving to work, for instance. Is the nuclear system “tolerably safe”?80 The conversation between proponents of deterrence and anti-nuclear activists should revolve around the costs and benefits equation. It is also far from certain that such safety mechanisms and human resistance will always be present in the decision-making complexes of all nuclear-armed states (think North Korea or Pakistan, for instance).

Nevertheless, a history of nearly 40 crises with some nuclear dimension has taught an important lesion: solid command-and-control arrangements, sound procedures, constant vigilance, efficient training, and cool-headedness of leadership have ensured—and can continue to ensure—that nuclear weapons will continue to play only a deterrence role. “Luck” has very little to do with it.

### 2NC -- AT: Arsenal Size

#### Even small arsenals cause extinction.

Trevithick and Rogoway ’19 [Joseph and Tyler; February 27; Military Analyst, M.A. in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University, B.A. in the History and Policy of International Relations at Carnegie-Mellon University; Defense Journalist; The Drive, “Yes, India And Pakistan Could End The World As We Know It Through A Nuclear Exchange,” <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26674/yes-india-and-pakistan-could-end-the-world-as-we-know-it-through-a-nuclear-exchange>; RP]

A global threat

India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are tiny compared to those of the [United States and Russia](http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26013/russia-says-its-own-new-weapons-are-exempt-after-accusing-u-s-of-violating-nuclear-arms-deal), and these weapons are focused primarily on deterring each other, but that does not mean they're purely regional threats. Unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons create lasting and far-reaching effects that scientists have posited could upend life on Earth if warring parties were to use them in sufficient numbers.

[In 2012](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSAD.pdf), Alan Robock, a distinguished professor in the Department of Environmental  Sciences and Associate Director of the Center for Environmental Prediction at Rutgers University, and Owen Brian Toon, a professor in the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a research associate at  the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado, Boulder, argued that it might not take a large amount of nuclear weapons to create a scenario commonly known as "[Nuclear Winter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_winter)."

In general, this hypothesized event occurs when smoke and soot from nuclear explosions block significant amounts of sunlight from reaching the earth's surface, leading to a precipitous drop in temperatures that results in mass crop failure and widespread famine.

Robcock and Toon summarized their findings, which were based in part on their previous work, in an article in the Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, [writing](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSAD.pdf):

"Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs – only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power – as airbursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the [Little Ice Age](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_Ice_Age) of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.

The bomb the United States dropped on Hiroshima Japan, known as [Little Boy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_Boy), was an inefficient and essentially experimental design with a yield of around 15 kilotons. The reported results from [Indian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_weapons_tests_of_India) and Pakistani nuclear testing indicate that both countries can meet this threshold and both countries' weapons programs have almost certainly matured in the decades since.

In previous studies, Robcock, working with others, postulated that temperature changes could begin within 10 days of a limited nuclear exchange and the effects from the detonations of 100 nuclear weapons in the 15-kiloton class would directly result in the deaths of [at least 20 million people](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/warconsequences/fivemilliontonsofsmoke/). The second order impacts would be even worse in the years that followed.

In 2014, Michael Mills and Julia Lee-Taylor, both then working at the federally-funded National Center for Atmospheric Research's (NCAR) Earth System Laboratory, authored another paper with Robcock and Toon. This [study concluded](https://web.archive.org/web/20140308191334/http:/acd.ucar.edu/~mmills/pubs/2014_EarthsFuture_Mills_et_al.pdf) again that detonation of 100 15-kiloton yield bombs in a purely regional conflict would result in "multi-decadal global cooling" and "would put significant pressures on global food supplies and could trigger a global nuclear famine."

It is important to note that[critics have questioned](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_winter#Critical_response_to_the_more_modern_papers) whether the Nuclear Winter concept relies on too many assumptions and would ever actually occur. At the center of many of these rebuttals are debates about whether the nuclear explosions would truly create the amount of smoke and soot necessary for major climate change, as well as the specific conditions for those particles to remain in the atmosphere for a prolonged period of time.

The studies here do indicate significant impacts based on a relatively limited number of nuclear detonations of smaller yield devices, though. But even if the impacts are less pronounced than projected in this particular scenario, they could be far more severe if India and Pakistan were to use a larger number weapons and/or ones of higher yields, which both belligerents readily have.

In addition, Nuclear Winter is just one of the potential things that might happen following a nuclear exchange between the longtime foes. A detonation of dozens of nuclear weapons, even small ones, would throw hazardous nuclear fallout [into the air](http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/19450/u-s-training-for-arctic-nuclear-satellite-disaster-amid-russian-weapons-developments) that, depending on the weather pattern, could carry that material [far and wide](https://futureoflife.org/background/us-nuclear-targets/?cn-reloaded=1#nukemap), causing both near- and short-term health impacts. The various [ground zeroes](https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/) themselves would be irritated and potentially hazardous for many years to come.

Depending on where the detonations occur, a nuclear exchange could potentially cut people off from critical water and food supplies, putting increased and potentially unsustainable strains on uncontaminated areas.  After the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, situated in Ukraine, [melted down and exploded](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster) in 1986, authorities established a 1,000 square mile restricted access "[exclusion zone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_Exclusion_Zone)" that remains in place today.

There would also be a major danger of second-order "spillover" effects, as individuals fled affected areas, putting economic and political strains on neighboring regions. This could inflame existing tensions not directly related to the inter-state conflict between India or Pakistan or lead to all new and potentially violent competition for what might already be limited resources. India has already threatened to [weaponize water access](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/world/asia/india-pakistan-water-kashmir.html) in its latest spat with the Pakistanis.

Any serious impacts on food and water supplies, or other economic upheavals as a direct or indirect result of the conflict, would have cascading impact across South Asia and beyond, as well. The very threat of a potential India-Pakistan war of any kind already caused [some negative reactions](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/27/indian-air-force-plane-crashes-in-kashmir-says-indian-police-official.html) in regional financial markets. Those markets would certainly collapse after an unprecedented nuclear exchange actually occurred, and that is before the long-term physical impacts of such an event would even manifest themselves.

Overall, we are talking about a sudden and dramatic geopolitical, financial, and environmental shift that would change our reality in a matter of hours. Even then, the darkness, both figuratively and literally, that could propagate over the weeks, months, and years would be far more damaging.

How great is the risk?

So far, India and Pakistan have not made any clear indications that the fighting is close to crossing their nuclear thresholds. Pakistan's warnings about the [risks of escalation](http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26642/pakistan-promises-retaliation-makes-nuclear-threats-after-indian-jets-bomb-its-territory) seem more calculated to try and prompt India to back down.

India itself has a so-called "no first use" policy, which means it has publicly pledged to use its nuclear weapons only in retaliation to a nuclear strike. However, experts have increasingly called into question whether this is truly the case and whether India might be developing delivery systems more suited to a first strike should there be a need to shift policies.

Pakistan, however, does not have a no first use policy and has insisted on its right to employ nuclear weapons to defend itself even in the face of purely conventional threat. Pakistani officials have, in the past, [specifically cited this policy](https://www.cfr.org/event/promoting-us-pakistan-relations-future-challenges-and-opportunities) as way of deterring India, which has a much larger and in some cases more advanced conventional force, and preventing larger wars.

The concern, then, is that this policy appears to have failed, at least to some degree, with India's strike on undisputed Pakistani territory on Feb. 26, 2019. India, however, did not target Pakistani forces in that instance and exchanges between the two countries have been limited, at least so far, to the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region, where violent skirmishes occur semi-regularly without precipitating a larger confrontation.

We can only hope that the two countries will find a diplomatic solution to this latest conflict and avoid any further escalation. If things were to spiral out of control and lead to the use of nuclear weapons, it would be something that would threaten all of humanity.

### AT: Turkey – 1NC

#### The alliance is over. Any benefit to Turkish membership is long-dead. Kicking them out just formalizes it.

GM 19 (Geopolitical Monitor, “Point Counterpoint: Turkey Should Be Expelled from NATO,” <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/point-counterpoint-turkey-should-be-expelled-from-nato/)//BB>

As such, many claim that ousting Ankara from NATO is an option to be seriously considered. In principle, this raises costs in the form of losing a powerful partner in a strategic position, but in practice the problem may be less serious than it appears. The assets currently based on Turkish territory can be moved to more trustworthy partners, even though this would have some operational consequences. Most importantly, Turkey’s own uncooperative, if not outright abrasive, attitude already offsets the advantages its membership is supposed to bring. At the same time, expelling Turkey would allow the Organization and its members to simply counter Ankara whenever the latter’s actions go against its common interests, and NATO would be freed from any obligation to protect an untrustworthy ally that does little to promote the common interest and often acts openly against it in a manner that undermines NATO’s cohesion and policies. As such, Ankara’s exit from NATO would put an end to the numerous problems linked to its membership. And, arguably, it’s the Turkish government itself that is choosing this path. Ankara’s recent tilts toward rival powers like Russia and Iran seems to indicate that it is already drifting away from its trans-Atlantic commitments; therefore, expelling the country from NATO would simply make official the de facto break-up that Turkey has been actively seeking over the past decade.

### AT: Turkey – 2NC

#### Turkey is actively working to help Russia and Iran, against US interests

Rubin 21 - is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (Michael Rubin, “To Use Turkey as a Bulwark Against Russia and Iran Is Wishful Thinking,” July 12 2021, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/use-turkey-bulwark-against-russia-and-iran-wishful-thinking-189524)//mcu>

For decades, Turkey was a staunch Cold War ally. One of only two NATO members to border the Soviet Union, Turkey went above and beyond in its partnership with the United States: Turkey contributed more men under arms to NATO than Germany and France combined. Turkey subsequently joined the Baghdad Pact and Turks fought alongside the United States in the Korean War. Behind the scenes, Turkey proved crucial to numerous intelligence and counter-terror operations. With the end of the Cold War, bilateral relations remained strong, at least **until the rise of** Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip **Erdoğan**. Slowly but deliberately, Erdoğan turned away from the West. He picked fights like a master tactician, confident that he could find former ambassadors and others in the State Department, White House, or pay-to-play think tanks. He artfully played and rewarded those inclined to apologize for any Turkish outrage or desperate to preserve the alliance. The frequency of U.S. elections and new U.S. administrations—at least in comparison to the last two decades in Turkey—meant Erdoğan could always find an American official eager for a reset. Often, those seeking to promote rapprochement with Turkey argue that repairing the relationship is necessary given the broader strategic imperative of checking Russia’s and Iran’s geopolitical ambitions. **The idea that Turkey can be a bulwark against either is magical thinking**. It rests upon an embrace of an Istanbul bubble not representative of broader Turkish thinking, a wholescale embrace of the notion that Turkey’s depiction of its enemies and its narrative of history is accurate, and an anachronistic idea that Turkey has not changed over the decades. The idea that it is possible to ignore the ideology and volatility in Erdoğan is analogous to embracing Iranian reformists in the hope that they will somehow nullify the influence of the supreme leader. Likewise, to believe that nearly two decades of Erdoğanism has not changed Turkish society is to believe that twenty years of Khomeinism did not change Iran. Both are foolish delusions. Consider, for example, the notion that **Turkey checks Russia’s interests**. In May 2010, Russia and Turkey signed energy cooperation agreements to give Turkey its first nuclear power plant, with help from Russian energy companies. Earlier this year, Russian president Vladimir Putin and Erdoğan jointly celebrated the start of the construction of the new Akkuyu power plant. **Such cooperation has become the rule rather than the exception**. Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia has made headlines not because it represents a lucrative contract for Russia, but because the integration of S-400s into Turkey’s air defense would **require compromising NATO electronics and computer codes to Russian engineers.** Even if Turkey kept the S-400s on a separate system, they might be used to track and gather data on NATO air platforms. In 2016, the two counties signed an agreement on the TurkStream gas pipeline and, on January 8, 2020, they launched the pipeline. To suggest Germany’s pursuit of Nord Stream 2 is pro-Putin (it is) but, by omission, bless Turkey’s involvement in the TurkStream pipeline defies logic. Syria has become a flashpoint for Turkey’s Islamist ambitions. The reason why American officials from both parties ignore Turkish complaints about U.S. partnership with pro-PKK groups is not because of some conspiracy to promote Russian or Iranian interest as some suggest, but rather because Turkey’s partnership with the Islamic State forced that cooperation in the first place. Given how Turkey and Russia often appear on separate sides in the Syria conflict, it might be possible to argue that Turkey’s involvement checks Russian ambitions. The problem, **however**, is that **Turkey’s approach to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad is inconsistent**. In May 2007, the PKK derailed a train in Turkey that was carrying rocket launchers, mortar shells, and light arms to Syria, likely destined to Hezbollah. For example, in 2008 and 2009 Erdoğan was hosting joint cabinet meetings with Assad and vacationing with the Syrian dictator on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Certainly, the Syrian civil war changed perspectives but, on January 24, 2017, Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed an agreement to establish de-escalation zones and essentially cooperate to create spheres of influence in Syria. Damascus and Ankara replicated the same model in Libya and in Nagorno-Karabakh as well. Officials in both Armenia and Artsakh—as the self-styled Armenian state in Nagorno-Karabakh calls itself—openly speculate that Turkey traded influence in Idlib to Russia in exchange for the Kremlin agreeing to greater Turkish involvement in the South Caucasus. It is true that Turkey’s relationship with Russia has not always gone smoothly. In October 2012, Turkey forced a Syrian passenger plane to land, accusing it of carrying Russian munitions leading Russian officials to accuse Turkey of endangering Russian passengers. Three years later, Turkey shot down a Russian military jet close to the Syrian border. Putin called the move a “stab in the back.” Russia suspended military contracts, instituted a travel ban against Turkey, and implemented sanctions in response. After Erdoğan apologized**, however, Russo-Turkish relations resumed where they had left off**. Erdoğan’s use of the Gülen bogeyman to deflect blame from the consequences from his own policy choices proved useful in papering over other crises, such as when an off-duty Turkish police officer assassinated the Russian ambassador to Turkey. Certainly, tensions remain and the Kremlin is not afraid to play hardball with Erdoğan but whether out of ideological symbiosis or trade, **neither Erdoğan nor Putin appears willing to break their embrace**. The two leaders have met nearly two dozen times in either Turkey or Russia since 2012, and that figure does not include phone calls, video conferences, or mutual attendance at multiparty summits in third countries. Nor does it factor in Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan’s frequent travels to Moscow. The money at stake is significant. In 2019, Turkey’s exports to Russia totaled $4.15 billion, and Russian exports to Turkey were five times that amount. It is likewise farcical to believe Turkey can be a bulwark against Iranian influence. When, in 2010, Erdoğan appointed Fidan to be his intelligence chief, alarm bells sounded in Western capitals where his Western counterparts knew him as an Iran sympathizer if not an asset. To couch a renewed Turkish alliance as good for Israel or Jews is absurd. Fidan not only personally supervised efforts to unravel Turkey-Israel ties but also ordered Turkish intelligence actively to monitor Jews. He killed two birds with one stone when he allegedly exposed an Israeli spy ring targeting Iran’s nuclear program and has also betrayed intelligence to Hamas and China. Under Fidan, Turkey also endangered American forces by exposing the locations and supplies of U.S. forces operating in Syria. To suggest, in each case, that Turkey is simply acting in pique toward some sleight or following its own interests misses the point. Strong allies share not only short-term interests but also a broader ideological base. This has been the key to ensuring the stability of the post–World War II liberal order. The Turkish government, however, **no longer shares common values with the United States or the West.** Nor after two decades bombarded by vile anti-Western, anti-Semitic propaganda does a Turkish public, at least that beyond a few central Istanbul neighborhoods, some more cosmopolitan areas in Ankara, and the Mediterranean coast. Forty percent of the Turkish population has lived the entirety of their conscious lives under Erdoğan’s domination. To excuse Erdoğan as transactional is equally bizarre. In times of crises, allies do not seek to engage both sides in a bidding war for Turkey’s affection but that is at best what Erdoğan now tries to do. Turkey is skilled at caviar diplomacy; I know. While I never solicited nor received Turkish money (or that of any other foreign state), I was a frequent guest at Turkish conferences until the Erdoğan regime grew frustrated with both my refusal to promote its party line and my willingness to talk directly in the spirit of independent research to those it deemed enemies. Turkey continues to throw out the red carpet for those who amplify its narrative and offers golden parachutes for diplomats who amplify Turkish interests. Conversely, it restricts access to academics and policy analysts who do not tow its party line. Such enticement, however, is not only intellectually dishonest but also makes for buffoonish policy prescriptions, the notion that Turkey today can be a bulwark against Russia and Iran chief among them.

## Advantage Two

### AT: DIB Adv---1NC

#### Arm sales not key to the DIB

Eugene Gholz, 2019 Associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, and he was awarded the US Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Medal for his service as senior advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, “Conventional Arms Transfers and US Economic Security” https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13\_Issue-1/Gholz.pdf

Conventional arms transfers can have separate, microeconomic effects of interest to a discussion of economic security, including effects on innovation and manufacturing highlighted in the Presidential Memorandum. The defense industry is not like a normal commercial industry, where corporations use retained earnings from their past sales—or borrowing from investors, who expect to be repaid from future sales revenue—to invest in research and development.18 Innovation in the defense industry is mostly supported by direct government research and development (R&D) contracts. That is, the DOD customer directs the trajectory of innovation and pays for specific R&D effort. Another fraction of total defense R&D comes from companies’ Independent Research and Development (IR&D) expenditures, reimbursed by the government as part of the overhead cost of other government-funded defense projects. IR&D spending is company directed, but it is also paid for by the DOD customer, not drawn from the company’s retained earnings. As a result, general increases in defense firms’ profitability—which might stem from arms sales approved under the CAT policy—do not generally have much effect on defense innovation at the systems level. However, many suppliers in the defense supply chain operate on commercial terms, and for them, the general added revenues from expanded defense sales contribute to the retained earnings that support their R&D investment.19 Thus, at the supplier level, arms sales can contribute to US innovation. However, generally, the suppliers are less visible, as are the innovations they might choose to invest in with the marginal dollar of income. Due to that lack of visibility, it would be difficult for an economic assessment, as part of the CAT approval process, to give much weight to the potential innovation-related investments by commercial firms at lower tiers of the defense supply chain

#### Biden ended sales to Saudi Arabia

Abramson 21 (Jeff, March. Senior fellow for conventional arms control and transfers at the Arms Control Association. He also directs the Forum on the Arms Trade, a global network of civil society experts he helped found in 2015 for strengthening public efforts to address the humanitarian, economic and other implications of arms transfers, security assistance, and weapons use. "U.S. Arms Sales Under Review" <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-03/news/us-arms-sales-under-review>)

In a significant reversal from the Trump administration, President Joe Biden said that the United States would end its support for “offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales.” His announcement came a week after Secretary of State Antony Blinken indicated that the administration was pausing recent arms sales in order to review them, putting in question the fate of billions of dollars of Trump-era deals with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

#### Thumps.

Mehta 3/15 (Aaron, deputy editor and senior Pentagon correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Defense Department and its international partners. https://www.defensenews.com/global/2021/03/15/us-increases-dominance-of-global-arms-exports/)

The United States has increased its share of the global arms market, while the Middle East is showing steady growth as a customer, according to new information released March 15 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

From 2015 to 2019, the U.S. contributed about 35 percent of global arms sales. SIPRI’s new figures, studying the years 2016-2020, show the U.S. contributing about 37 percent of the overall arms market. American arms customers included 96 different states during this time period, with 47 percent of those sales going to the Middle East, according to the think tank.

Saudi Arabia, which was a favorite customer of the Trump administration, accounted for 24 percent of total U.S. arms exports, the report stated.

#### Pentagon, Middle East and Asian allies fill in

Hartung 19 — William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, former Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, former Director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute, 2019 (“Do U.S. Defense Firms Really Need To Export Arms To Saudi Arabia?,” *Forbes*, June 24th, Available Online at https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2019/06/24/do-u-s-defense-firms-really-need-arms-exports/#2eeb1e7c63eb, Accessed 06-24-2019)

Is this just another case of Trumpian exaggeration, aimed at portraying him as a master deal maker who can bring good jobs to America in general and the heartland in particular, or is there more to it? There’s no question that particular companies benefit from Saudi sales. The bulk of the more than $150 billion in U.S. arms offers to Riyadh since 2009 have involved four of America’s top five defense contractors – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, and General Dynamics – in deals that have involved everything from combat aircraft to tanks to missile defense systems to armored vehicles to combat ships. The most controversial deals have involved precision-guided munitions that have been used by Saudi Arabia in its brutal war in Yemen, which has sparked one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes. And all of these firms are seeking to grow their export markets, both to increase profits and to provide insurance against the ups and downs of the Pentagon procurement budget. But the truth of the matter is that U.S. firms could do without sales to Saudi Arabia and other repressive regimes, and they’d still be doing just fine financially. The current Pentagon budget is at one of the highest levels since World War II, and it provides ample funding for procurement and R&D, much of which lands in the coffers of major defense firms that are the leading weapons exporters. This is particularly true when one considers that the most likely outcome would not be a total ban on sales to Saudi Arabia, but a prohibition on weapons most relevant to the Yemen war – precision-guided munitions in particular. Other deals, like a lucrative $15 billion sale of the Lockheed Martin THAAD missile defense system to Riyadh, would likely remain untouched. Arms sales in general are important to key firms like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which got roughly one-quarter to one-third of their revenues, respectively, from foreign sales in 2018. But the biggest export earners were missile defense systems to Riyadh, would likely remain untouched. Arms sales in general are important to key firms like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which got roughly one-quarter to one-third of their revenues, respectively, from foreign sales in 2018. But the biggest export earners were missile defense systems and combat aircraft exported to allies in Europe and Asia, not bombs being used in war zones.

### DIB Low---2NC

#### DIB is dead now.

Clark 21 (Maya,research assistant in The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, focusing on defense industrial base issues. Rhttps://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/bidens-supply-chain-executive-order-doesnt-boost-the-defense-industrial-base-and)

Last week, President Joe Biden signed a far-reaching executive order calling for supply chain reviews across many economic sectors deemed strategically significant. For some sectors, these efforts are unprecedented—and problematic. But such reviews are nothing new within the defense industry—and that’s what makes the defense aspects of this order such a good move.

The “Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains” has two parts. First, it calls for a one-hundred-day supply chain reviews for four strategic sectors: semiconductors; critical minerals, including rare earth elements; pharmaceuticals, and high-capacity batteries (like those used in electric vehicles).

Second, it requires various executive agencies to conduct in-depth assessments of numerous industrial bases: the defense industrial base, but also the newly-coined “public health and biological preparedness industrial base,” a “transportation industrial base,” “agricultural base,” “information and communications technology (ICT) industrial base” and an “energy industrial base.” The agencies must submit their reports to the president within a year.

Whether it’s a good idea to refer to certain parts of the U.S. economy as “industrial bases” is doubtful. Nor is it the proper role of the federal government to study these private industries’ strengths and weaknesses.

But the defense industrial base is different, and always has been. The Biden administration’s move to study, assess, and report on the health of particular defense-related sectors, as well as the defense industrial base as a whole, could aid efforts to mitigate national security risks.

The defense industrial base comprises many private sector firms providing goods and services that support the U.S. military, as well as a network of government depots, arsenals and facilities. This base spans a variety of sectors (shipbuilding, munitions, radar and electronics, etc.) and encompasses extremely large firms (e.g., Lockheed Martin and Huntington Ingalls Industries) as well as small businesses making specialty components.

What brings these diverse firms and sectors under the title of “defense industrial base” is their criticality to the country’s ability to defend itself and its interests. In a conflict, the United States would depend on all of these firms and its government installations to supply the tools the military needs.

But trends in the defense industrial base are weakening its ability to meet the current needs of the U.S. military, let alone respond in an armed conflict. Domestic infrastructure for the manufacture and maintenance of defense items is often outdated, creating risks for both service members and for workers in these facilities. Some defense components are available from only one supplier. Others are only produced overseas—in some cases by America’s competitors, like China. For example, 84 percent of the Defense Department’s electronics components suppliers are located overseas.

Policymakers in Congress, the White House, and the Pentagon all need to respond to these threats to U.S. national security. But in order to fix the problem, they need a clearer idea of what the problem is.

This is where Biden’s new executive order comes in. The supply chain review for rare earth elements should create a better understanding of the weak links in that chain, which in turn will help make efforts to shore up those weak links more targeted and effective. The review of the semiconductor supply chain will hopefully provide similar information for a predominantly commercial sector that is also vital to defense systems.

#### F-35 cuts are thumped, but government funding steps in

Aaron Mehta 3-20-2020 {Aaron Mehta is Deputy Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and its international partners. “How coronavirus could impact the defense supply chain.” https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/03/20/how-coronavirus-could-impact-the-defense-supply-chain/}//JM

WASHINGTON — As the American defense industry tries to assess the way forward under the new coronavirus pandemic, it should keep a close eye on the lower tiers of its supply chain, analysts warn. There are two key factors when considering supply chain logistics: production and delivery. On the production side, hurdles include the potential for workers to have to halt production work due to the spread of the virus — something that has happened, albeit temporarily, at F-35 production spots in Italy and Japan — as well as economic impacts. Paul Scharre, director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, said that trying to predict the supply chain’s future is like looking into a crystal ball that is zooming by your face at 100 mph. “For companies that are predominantly defense companies, government money is likely to keep coming,” he said. “The real source of disruption is if there are statewide mandated shutdowns saying: ‘Don’t go to work.’ ” Small businesses may feel the economic pain the most, and that could spell trouble down the road. A 2018 Pentagon report on the defense-industrial base warned of “domestic extinction” among the sole suppliers for critical industrial parts — shops that could fold under rough economic conditions as the world is seeing now. For instance, there are only four American suppliers with the capability to manufacture large, complex, single-pour aluminum and magnesium sand castings needed to support American air power. Those suppliers “face perpetual financial risk and experience bankruptcy threats and mergers mirroring the cyclicality of DoD [Department of Defense] acquisition,” the report said. And there is only one qualified source for the upper, intermediate and sump housing for an unnamed heavy-lift platform used by the Marines (potentially the CH-53 King Stallion) that around 2017 went through bankruptcy proceedings. “Without a qualified source for these castings, the program will face delays, impeding the U.S. ability to field heavy lift support to Marine Corps expeditionary forces,” the report said. Warned Martijn Rasser, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security: “For small business, a shutdown would be extremely difficult to get through because even with bailouts and economic stimulus, once those businesses close up, its really hard to get those started again.” “If an airline goes out of business, the planes don’t disappear — you can start over. If it’s a highly specialized manufacturing company, those employees are going to disperse and try to find other work. So I think that’s something to be very cognizant of because of all the consolidation in the defense industry,” he added. “If they have to curtail operations for an extended period of time, it’s extremely difficult to get it going again.” Transportation of goods is another potential issue to watch, particularly as the commercial aviation industry is shutting down huge chunks of its operations. Noted Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “What if parts of our transportation sector shut down so parts can’t ship, or they’re late shipping?” That may already be happening, with cargo carriers reporting increased demand for shipping goods globally. A Thursday report on industry trade publication Air Cargo World warned that the “air cargo industry is seeing daily slashes to airfreight capacity and massive jumps in rates due to the extensive number of passenger flights cancelled globally as part of the effort to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. As a result, space on most trade lanes is tight and some even have backlogs.” Travel restrictions between countries could complicate issues, given the increasing global nature of the supply chain on programs such as the F-35 fighter jet. A delay of parts getting from a tier 4 to tier 3 supplier could turn into a delay from a tier 3 to tier 2 supplier, and in turn could lead to a delay in delivery of a defense article to the Pentagon. Still, the delays don’t currently look likely to be too serious in context, said Byron Callan of Capital Alpha Partners.

### Europe Shields---2NC

#### Europe DIB would fill in, solves the impact- they’re interoperable with the US

Theohary 16 (Catherine, Specialist in National Security Policy and Information Operations, Congressional Research Service. December 19. "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-2015" https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44716.pdf)

The major West European suppliers, individually, have enhanced their competitive position in weapons exports through strong government marketing support for their foreign arms sales. All of them can produce both advanced and basic air, ground, and naval weapon systems. The four major West European suppliers have sometimes competed successfully for arms sales contracts with developing nations against the United States, which has tended to sell to several of the same major clients, especially to the Persian Gulf states that see the United States as the ultimate guarantor of Gulf security. The continuing demand for U.S. weapons in the global arms marketplace, from a large established client base, has created a more difficult environment for individual West European suppliers to secure large new contracts with developing nations on a sustained basis. Yet, as the data indicate, the major West European suppliers continue to make significant arms transfer contracts each year. In 2015, a contract with Qatar for the Rafale fighter jet and missiles for a value of $7.1 billion contributed to France’s record-setting export total, along with a contract with Egypt for two dozen Rafale fighter jets and a naval frigate worth nearly $6 billion.

An effort to enhance their market share of the arms trade in the face of the strong demand for U.S. defense equipment, among other considerations, was a key factor in inducing European Union (EU) member states to adopt a new code of conduct for defense procurement practices. This code was agreed on November 21, 2005, at the European Defense Agency’s (EDA) steering board meeting. Currently voluntary, the EU hopes it will become mandatory, and through its mechanisms foster greater cooperation within the European defense equipment sector in the awarding of contracts for defense items. By successfully securing greater intra-European cooperation in defense program planning and collaboration in defense contracting, the EU hopes that the defense industrial bases of individual EU states will be preserved, thereby enhancing the capability of European defense firms to compete for arms sales throughout the world. Some European arms companies have begun, and others completed the phasing out of production of certain types of weapon systems. These suppliers have increasingly sought to engage in joint production ventures with other key European weapons suppliers or even client countries in an effort to sustain major sectors of their individual defense industrial bases—even if a substantial portion of the weapons produced are for their own armed forces. Examples are the Eurofighter and Eurocopter projects. A few European suppliers have also adopted the strategy of cooperating in defense production ventures with the United States such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), rather than attempting to compete directly, thus meeting their own requirements for advanced combat aircraft while positioning themselves to share in profits resulting from future sales of this new fighter aircraft.7

### Arms Sales Not Key---2NC

#### Arm sales aren’t even profitable

Trevor Thrall, 4-5-2019, associate professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, "The False Promises of Trump’s Arms Sales", Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/04/false-promises-trumps-arms-sales/156071/

Weakening the economic rationale even further is the fact that in order to seal major deals, American defense contractors have to offer massive discounts, or offsets, to the purchasing nations in the form of coproduction arrangements or technology transfer. In 2014, for example, these offsets equaled roughly one-third of the value of total U.S. arms sales. These offsets mean not only that American arms sales are less profitable than they appear on paper, but also that they lead to fewer jobs created in the United States than many, including the president, would like to think. Trump’s big Saudi arms deal, for example, would likely lead to somewhere between 20,000 and 40,000 jobs, or less than two-tenths of one percent of the American labor market. The unpleasant truth is that the underwhelming economic benefits cannot justify Washington’s love of arms sales. Arms sales simply do not benefit the U.S. economy nearly as much as Trump likes to claim. Meanwhile, a large percentage of American arms sales goes to countries with horrible human rights records, to nations where arms are at risk of finding their way into the wrong hands, and to nations embroiled in dangerous and destabilizing conflicts. Given this, it is long past time to rethink American arms sales policy.

#### And the military won’t even use the new technology created anyways so they can’t solve hegemony

Leo Blanken 18, associate professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California., 1-29-2018, "America’s Military Is Choking on Old Technology," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/29/americas-military-is-choking-on-old-technology/

The current rate of technological change may make many current U.S. military systems obsolete in the coming decades Advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, material science, and nanotechnology threaten to produce qualitative — not just incremental — change in the conduct of warfare in the near future. Although the U.S. has spent far more on standing military forces than other countries, for far longer, this accumulated advantage is also a vulnerability. It presents an opportunity for Washington’s international adversaries and competitors to reap the advantage of their backwardness and leapfrog the U.S. with emerging technology. This is exacerbated by the Pentagon’s commitment to significant investment in existing systems, the proverbial “last year’s model.” There are many hindrances to efficiently divorcing the U.S. military from old technologies. First, for technology to be widely adopted across an enterprise like the Pentagon, it needs to be woven into bureaucratic structures, which are inherently sticky. Recruitment and training of personnel for specialized skill sets, the development and implementation of standard operating procedures, costly facilities, maintenance, and other supporting investments are necessary to enable the use of technology. Further, bureaucracies often build their identities around technology, turning threats to the technology into threats to the organization’s very essence. The resulting entities are often large, complex, and full of self-interested actors who seek to maintain and expand their bureaucratic realms. Once these organizations exist, they are extremely difficult to dismantle. Therefore, if a bureaucracy and its culture have been “purpose-built” around a particular technology, then it may be extremely difficult to nimbly leverage new technologies. The revolution in naval architecture (wood to iron) and propulsion systems (sail to steam) in the late 19th century is a great example of this. Despite proving their value during the Civil War, steam-powered ironclads faced vociferous opposition in the 1870s from naval leadership, who sought to undermine these technologies and the new class of professional engineers associated with them. William McBride summarized this conundrum when he said, “Military hierarchies seek stability, and when a new technology challenges that stability, the reaction can be sharp and hostile.” The Pentagon and the supporting defense industrial base’s adverse reaction to the Third Offset Strategy underscored this dynamic. New technology may also offend the romanticized values of a profession. One anonymous British observer, upon seeing an ironclad ship for the first time in 1861, bemoaned: “It is not to be supposed for a moment that our high-spirited youth of the aristocracy, and our race of seamen … would practise a profession of butchery and destruction from behind iron walls … Those who know any thing of sailors must see the charm of the life which animates them; and it is only surprising that any who confess their sympathy for the profession should be advocating the construction of engines (they cannot be called ships) devoted to all the grossness and barbarity of war, while they are deprived of every thing attractive to a sailor.” The Pentagon has experienced a similar sentiment today with institutional pushback against drones. The Air Force and Navy continue to wrestle with recruitment, retention, and career advancement within the drone operator community, due to among other factors, a preference toward the existing manned warplane community. Compounding the challenge of cultural resistance is the fact that a set of external interest groups can accrue around the maintenance of a particular military technology. Major defense firms and lobbyists seeking profits and members of Congress seeking jobs in their districts ensure that legacy defense programs continue for years beyond their “state of the art” days. For these actors, replacing and upgrading existing systems with expensive new features (referred to as “gold-plating”) seems to be the safest way to satisfy their parochial interests. Nick Kotz’s classic study of the B-1 bomber shows how major investment in military technology can be driven by such interests. Rather than adjusting investments to changing conditions (improved Soviet air defenses), older concepts (manned strategic bombers) were fitted with ever more extravagant technologies. Such dynamics also exist with the Trident submarine, MX missile, and even the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. They run the risk of resulting in what Mary Kaldor coined a “baroque arsenal” of expensive and outdated platforms that bog down force structure. Simple logic dictates that a race to acquire new technology while simultaneously maintaining investments in obsolete technology will result in bankruptcy. The private sector would suffer from the same affliction if it were not for the fact that markets help tear down old technologies as soon as new ones emerge. But that doesn’t happen nearly as efficiently in government bureaucracies. Since their work is not disciplined by commercial market forces, they allow ineffective technologies and the companies that support them to survive — and even thrive — simply due to their ability to navigate the political system. This is best exemplified by Defense contractors that build their technology platforms in numerous congressional districts. Given the political cost of potential job losses, these platforms and their associated jobs become difficult not only to eliminate but even to modify in a significant way. Acquisition professionals in the Pentagon do not necessarily need to slash and burn their way through their existing technology but they do need to commit to a strategy that recognizes the changing technological landscape and the threats it already poses. A senior official, whether it be the chief management officer or the new undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment, should be specifically charged with identifying obsolete technological investments and supporting their replacement. This does not need to be a zero-sum game where equipment is scrapped never to be seen, or replaced, again. As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, defense leaders can reduce institutional resistance by ensuring new technologies directly address existing missions. There are several notable examples of initiatives that do so, such as the Defense Innovation Unit – Experimental, SOFWERX, and the U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group and Mad Scientist initiative. These specialized entities have been created to identify, vet, and integrate innovations from the emerging tech environment; a parallel effort needs to be focused on shedding obsolete technologies, as necessary.

### DIB Resilient---2NC

#### DIB’s resilient

Caverley 18 – Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College, (4/6/18, Jonathan – also Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “America’s Arms Sales Policy: Security Abroad, Not Jobs at Home,” https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, accessed on 5/10/19, JMP)

The United States has the most diverse export portfolio in the world. In the past five years, it has delivered weapons to nearly 100 countries. Its best customer over this period, Saudi Arabia, only bought 13 percent of all U.S. arms exports (all data from SIPRI). By contrast, 58 percent of Russia exports go to just three countries (India, China, and Vietnam). For China, it’s 64 percent (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Algeria). Strong domestic demand also mitigates the pressure on a country to export. From 2010 to 2015 the United Kingdom, France, and Germany all exported about half of their defense production, while Russia exported 39 percent. The United States on average exports only a quarter of the arms produced by its firms. This combination of strong domestic demand and a diverse portfolio of client states makes America’s market power stronger than that of any other exporter. The United States is so economically advantaged in making and selling weapons that it can limit conventional-weapons proliferation, technology diffusion, and corruption in contracting arrangements (and maintain a robust defense industrial base) while retaining its commanding market position. Less powerful exporting states are generally too constrained by the economics of production to pursue any goals besides increased sales. There are a number of ways in which America’s leverage in the area of arms sales — and, therefore, its ability to exercise restraint — can further its foreign policy goals.

## DOD Tradeoff DA

### DOD Tradeoff---1NC

#### **Arms to Ukraine directly trade off with arms to Taiwan – the CCP is watching closely**

Lailari 22 - Taiwan News, Contributing Columnist (Guermantes, “Does the US focus on aid for Ukraine make Taiwan more vulnerable to Chinese invasion?,” *Taiwan News*, 5-16-22, <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4539871>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

Taiwan suffers as well from the Biden Administration’s and Congress’ enthusiasm for supporting Ukraine. Why? First, U.S. extravagant gifting of weapons to Ukrainian **forces tradeoffs in the U.S. ability to aid other**s. U.S. weapons stockpiles are shrinking to levels that **imperil the ability of U.S. forces to fight.** Until the U.S. replenishes those stockpiles, the U.S. will not be able to provide weapons to other countries that might fall victim to Russian, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or other invasions. The CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are pleased with this situation because the U.S. will neither have the funds **nor the arms available to send to Taiwan.** Second, a CCP-ordered embargo of non-PRC shipping and aircraft flying to Taiwan restricts U.S. and Asian allies’ options for supporting Taiwan. A nuclear war with China to end a Taiwan embargo is not a politically feasible policy option. Why would the U.S. and Taiwan’s allies not be able to send weapons or other supplies to Taiwan? Because the CCP will declare that providing arms or other materials to Taiwan is interfering in the internal affairs of China. In effect, acts countering the embargo would be considered casus belli, acts of war. If Russia had been able to close all of Ukraine’s borders, Russia would have made the same declaration regarding interference in Ukraine. Unfortunately for Russia, it did not control Ukraine’s western borders between Belarus and the Black Sea, which include the following NATO countries: Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. Through these NATO countries, military and other aid are flowing into Ukraine. Taiwan is an island and if the PLA Navy and Air Force control the ocean and the air around Taiwan, then the CCP could prevent other countries from helping Taiwan during a future conflict. On May 4, 2022, Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of United States Strategic Command, noted in his testimony to Congress that the CCP “is watching the war in Ukraine closely and will likely use nuclear coercion to their advantage in the future. Their intent is to **achieve the military capability to reunify Taiwan by 2027**, if not sooner.” The U.S. and Taiwan’s friends and allies should try to send military aid now and provide training before combat begins. Providing military aid and training now might be enough to deter the CCP long enough for Taiwan to become unpalatable for the CCP to “eat” at least for the short term. The anti-Russia coalition’s war fatigue, lack of supplies, funds, and foresight suggests Taiwan should prepare to defend itself.

## DOS CP

### DOS CP---1NC

#### **FMS is a form of security assistance**

DSCA no date – (“FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS),” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, <https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-military-sales-fms>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a form of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended [22 U.S.C. 2751, et. seq.] and a fundamental tool of U.S. foreign policy. Under Section 3, of the AECA, the U.S. may sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote world peace. Under FMS, the U.S. Government and a foreign government enter into a government-to-government agreement called a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA).

## Solvency

### NATO Says No

#### NATO says no – other issues take priority – Arctic, insurgencies, and space

Emmott and Sytas 22 – repoters for Reuters (Robin and Andrius, “The Baltic states want more NATO. They won't get all they seek,” *Reuters*, 6-15-22, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/baltic-states-want-more-nato-they-wont-get-all-they-seek-2022-06-15/>, Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been calling for their region to receive the biggest build-up of combat-ready NATO forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War, to be agreed at a summit on June 28-30 in Madrid. **It will not happen,** interviews with seven senior diplomats and officials from leading NATO allies show. This is partly because the proposals come as the NATO alliance faces a slew of demands not seen in decades: from countering Russia and China in the Arctic to quelling Islamic insurgencies in the Sahel, and tackling new frontiers in space. Since Russia invaded, the U.S. Congress has approved extra funds and the Pentagon sent F-35 stealth fighters, as well as attack helicopters, to Estonia; Britain doubled its force presence at Estonia's Tapa military base to around 1,700 personnel. But for many people in the region, which has been occupied by both Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany and which lies within striking distance of a Russian garrison at St. Petersburg, that is not enough. For instance, 84.6% of Latvian respondents to a Benu Aptiekas/Gemius poll in May said they were highly anxious about Russia's invasion. "The fact that we could be in danger, it's been on the table all the time," said Dzintra Bungs, 82, head of the Latvian Occupation Museum Association in Riga. "It is very important that we have woken up, and that all Europe awakes." The Baltics, with a combined population of just over six million, want the alliance to boost its pre-Ukraine invasion presence of around 5,000 multinational soldiers by as much as tenfold, as well as adding air and maritime defences. Many of NATO's 30 allies in Europe and the United States support the calls for a bigger force in principle, but in reality say allies can only commit to maintaining higher troop levels, pre-positioning more equipment, weapons and ammunition in the region and promising rapid reinforcements. The broad outline for leaders to agree at the summit, the diplomats and NATO officials said, is a model of larger multinational NATO battlegroups in the Baltics, with a commitment to quickly reinforce if Russia were about to invade. Planning for new air and maritime defences will come later. Many members, including Britain and the United States, **do not favour permanent new bases in the Baltics**, three of the diplomats told Reuters. They said it would cost billions and be hard to sustain: The states may not have enough troops and weaponry, and a permanent presence would be highly provocative for Moscow. "The Baltic states will not each get enough NATO troops to create a division," a NATO diplomat said, referring to their request for up to 15,000 troops across the region, as well as more on stand-by in allied countries to complement national forces. "Whatever is decided must be sustainable."

#### NATO says no – they don’t believe the Russian threat

Erlanger 22 - the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017 (Steven, “NATO Countries Pour Weapons Into Ukraine, Risking Conflict With Russia,” *NYTimes*, 3-2-22, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/europe/nato-weapons-ukraine-russia.html>, Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)

Divisions are opening among NATO members about how to boost military deployments in Eastern Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, amid disagreements about whether the Kremlin’s faltering battlefield effort means it cannot significantly threaten alliance territory. The debate underlines different assessments of the lessons from nearly three months of war in Ukraine. The Baltic states and Poland are asking for a significantly expanded military presence on their soil and new capabilities such as antiaircraft defense that could make it far harder for Russia to invade. Other policymakers, **including from France and Italy,** are voicing skepticism that the shambolic Russian invasion force will pose a threat to NATO territory anytime soon. An initial decision must be made by the end of June, when NATO leaders will meet at a summit in Madrid. At that gathering, they are also expected to give initial approval to Finland and Sweden’s membership applications, assuming Turkey dials back its objections. The expansion would itself significantly increase NATO’s military capability in the eastern part of the alliance. “Russia’s direct military aggression against NATO allies cannot be excluded,” according to a confidential joint proposal from the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that was obtained by The Washington Post. “Russia can rapidly mass military forces against NATO’s eastern border and confront the Alliance with a short war and fait accompli,” the document said, proposing that a division-size contingent of about 20,000 troops be tasked with speeding to each of the countries if they are under threat. Other countries are more cautious about robust new commitments in Eastern Europe, wary of signing on to large deployments that would be costly and would divert troops from other areas.

#### Germany says no – concerns over escalation

Gordon and Pancevski 22 – Reporter for the Wall Street Journal based in Washington, The Wall Street Journal's Germany correspondent, covering all aspects of Europe’s largest economy and its influence on the rest of the continent and beyond (Michael R. and Bojan, “Germany Blocks NATO Ally From Transferring Weapons to Ukraine,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 1-22-22, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-blocks-nato-ally-from-transferring-weapons-to-ukraine-11642790772>, Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)

Germany is blocking North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Estonia from giving military support to Ukraine by refusing to issue permits for German-origin weapons to be exported to Kyiv as it braces for a potential Russian invasion. Unlike the U.S., Britain, Poland and other allies, the German government has **declined to export lethal weapons directly to Ukraine.** In the case of Estonia, a small country on Russia’s northern border, Berlin is also refusing to allow a third country to send artillery to Ukraine because the weaponry originated in Germany, according to Estonian and German officials. The issue is being seen by Western security specialists and Ukraine as a test of Berlin’s arms-transfer policy during a mounting crisis in Europe and points to the difficulties the U.S. and its European allies are facing in forging a common response to Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine and demands. “Germany, they have a lot of hesitation to deliver to us,” Ukraine’s Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. German officials said the impasse results from a longstanding policy regarding arms exports to tense regions. “The principle governing arms exports is always the same—whether they come directly from Germany or from third countries—and no permission has been issued at this stage,” a German government spokesman said. “It is not possible to estimate the outcome of the process at this moment,” he added.

#### Germany says no – historic tensions

Gordon and Pancevski 22 – Reporter for the Wall Street Journal based in Washington, The Wall Street Journal's Germany correspondent, covering all aspects of Europe’s largest economy and its influence on the rest of the continent and beyond (Michael R. and Bojan, “Germany Blocks NATO Ally From Transferring Weapons to Ukraine,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 1-22-22, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-blocks-nato-ally-from-transferring-weapons-to-ukraine-11642790772>, Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)

Estonia in recent weeks has sought permission from Berlin to send the artillery units to Ukraine, which is required under Germany export laws, the German and Estonian officials said. Finland, which isn’t a member of NATO, is also required to authorize the delivery of the weapons by agreement with Germany. A spokesman for the Finnish government said that the procedure was a mere formality unrelated to the current situation in Ukraine. Germany is one of the world’s largest arms exporters and ships weapons to non-allied countries such as Egypt or Pakistan. German officials have said however, that **exporting arms to Ukraine is out of question** due to the current tensions and because of Germany’s role in starting World War II and the Nazi atrocities committed in the region. “Our restrictive position is **well known and is rooted in history**,” Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s foreign minister, said Monday in Kyiv as she stood beside her Ukrainian counterpart. Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s foreign minister, sought to play down the dispute, saying his nation’s “dialogue with Germany on this issue will continue.” Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, Andrij Melnyk, was more blunt: “This responsibility should be toward the Ukrainian people, who lost at least 8 million lives during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine.”

## Illicit Arms Turn

### Illicit Arms Turn---1NC

#### The plan’s arms sales get routed to terrorists and criminals in the black market

Lingzhi and Xiaoy 22 – reporters at The Global Times (Fan and Lin, “Weapons sent by US and NATO may fall into dark net and even to terrorists, leading widespread and unbearable cost,” *Global Times*, 6-9-22, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202206/1267729.shtml>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Heartless terrorists turned dreadful mercenaries, weapons scattered in a chaotic battlefield… These disturbing signs showed that a big, horrible disaster is sprawling in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Executive Director of Europol Catherine De Bolle told German media in late May that they were very concerned that the military equipment the West is sending to Ukraine will end up on the black market and **in the hands of terrorists and criminals.** Previous reports show that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) found the US was stepping up its efforts to recruit members of international terrorist groups, including extremist organizations, as mercenaries to fight in Ukraine and take part in sabotage operations against Russian forces. After US President Joe Biden formally signed the $40 billion aid package to Ukraine, this worry became more pressing. Can the flow of weapons from NATO and the US to Ukraine be monitored? Is it only a matter of time before terrorist groups take hold of those weapons? Who is laughing behind Europe's worried back? Several experts told the Global Times that it is **difficult to control the flow of weapons on the battlefield**. They noted that not only Europe, which has been deprived of its security autonomy by the US and NATO, but also the third world countries, will suffer the costs. Those who prefer to live by the sword will fall by the sword. While the military-industrial complex profiteers, **it is only a matter of time before this backfire**s, experts noted. Flow of illegal weapons Jürgen Stock, the head of Interpol, warned that once the Russia-Ukraine conflict ends, guns and heavy arms will flood the international market, according to a Guardian report. "Once the guns fall silent [in Ukraine], **illegal weapons will come**. We know this from many other instances of conflict. Criminals are even now, as we speak, focusing on them," said Stock, stressing that the illegal weapons flowing into the criminal market will create a challenge.

#### Black market arms trade in Ukraine causes arms racing and escalates terrorism.

Hudson 5/14/22 [John Hudson is a national security reporter at The Washington Post covering the State Department and diplomacy. He has reported from a mix of countries including Ukraine, Pakistan, Malaysia, China, and Georgia; “Flood of weapons to Ukraine raises fear of arms smuggling”; The Washington Post; May 14, 2022; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/05/14/ukraine-weapons-trafficking/]//eleanor

This uncomfortable reality for the United States and its allies comes amid urgent pleas from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to provide artillery needed to counter Russian forces in the country’s east and south. The Ukrainian leader’s appeals are credited with uniting House lawmakers behind the latest funding request in a bipartisan 368-to-57 vote on Tuesday. But the unprecedented influx of arms has prompted fears that some equipment could fall into the hands of Western adversaries or reemerge in faraway conflicts — for decades to come. “It’s just impossible to keep track of not only where they’re all going and who is using them, but how they are being used,” said Rachel Stohl, an arms-control expert and vice president at the Stimson Center. A State Department spokesman said the United States has conducted thorough vetting of the Ukrainian units it supplies while forcing Kyiv to sign agreements that “do not allow the retransfer of equipment to third parties without prior U.S. government authorization.” But the means of enforcing such contracts are relatively weak — and made even weaker by Washington’s own mixed history of compliance, as recently as last month. In mid-April, the United States boosted its involvement in the Ukraine conflict by announcing that it would transfer a fleet of Mi-17 helicopters to Ukraine that it originally purchased from Russia about a decade ago. The initial sale of the aircraft required the United States to sign a contract promising not to transfer the helicopters to any third country “without the approval of the Russian Federation,” according to a copy of the certificate posted on the website of Russia’s Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation. Russia has denounced the transfer, saying it “grossly violates the foundations of international law.” Arms experts say Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine more than justifies U.S. support, but the violation of weapons contracts chips away at the foundations of counter-proliferation efforts. “Breaking of those end-use agreements is a serious threat to the underlying, but weak, capacity for countries to control how weapons are used,” said Jeff Abramson, an expert on conventional arms transfers at the Arms Control Association. A Pentagon spokesman dismissed the criticisms, calling Russian charges a distraction and the transfer “permissible under U.S. law and consistent with our national security priorities.” “Russia’s claims are a disingenuous attempt to distract attention from Russia’s unprovoked invasion and its history of aggressive actions against Ukraine since 2014,” said Marine Corps Lt. Colonel Anton T. Semelroth. The job of ensuring U.S. weapons are used for their intended purpose — a joint responsibility of the departments of State and Defense — is made all the more difficult by the sheer volume of arms making their way to Ukraine. The emergency spending bill awaiting approval in the Senate will cement Ukraine’s status as the world’s single largest recipient of U.S. security assistance, receiving more in 2022 than the United States ever provided to Afghanistan, Iraq or Israel in a single year. It will add to the stocks of weapons the U.S. already committed to Ukraine, including 1,400 Stinger antiaircraft systems, 5,500 antitank missiles, 700 Switchblade drones, 90 long-range Howitzers artillery systems, 7,000 small arms, 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and numerous other mines, explosives and laser-guided rocket systems. Shoulder-fired Stinger missiles, capable of downing commercial airliners, are just one of the weapon systems experts worry could slip into the possession of terrorist groups seeking to carry out mass-casualty events. The Biden administration’s funding request includes $8.7 billion to replenish U.S. stores of weapons shipped to Ukraine, $6 billion to train and equip Ukrainian forces and $3.9 billion for U.S. forces deployed throughout Europe in response to the security crisis that’s been set off by the war. Other NATO countries have transferred billions of dollars in arms and military equipment since the start of hostilities. “The assistance exceeds the peak year of U.S. military assistance to Afghan security forces during that 20-year war,” said William Hartung, an arms control expert at the Quincy Institute think tank. “In that case the U.S. had a major presence in-country that created at least the possibility of tracking where weapons were ending up. By comparison, the U.S. government is flying blind in terms of monitoring weapons supplied to civilian militias and the military in Ukraine.” Ukraine’s history as a hub for arms trafficking dates to the fall of the Soviet Union, when the Soviet military left behind large amounts of small arms and light weapons in Ukraine without adequate record-keeping and inventory control. According to the Small Arms Survey, a Geneva-based research organization, a portion of the Ukrainian military’s 7.1 million small arms in stock in 1992 “were diverted to conflict areas” underscoring “the risk of leakage to the local black market.” The problem grew more acute after Russia’s invasion in 2014, which saw combatants looting arms and munition-storage facilities of Ukraine’s Security Service, Interior and Defense ministries. “Irregular fighters on both sides progressively gained access to a wide range of military-grade equipment, including the full spectrum of small arms and light weapons,” according to a report by the Small Arms Survey in 2017. “Officials estimated that at least 300,000 small arms and light weapons were looted or lost between 2013 and 2015,” providing a boon the country’s black market run by Mafia-style groups in Donbas region and other criminal networks. The U.S. government is well aware of the country’s challenges with weapons proliferation, though it has been vague in describing the precautions it’s taking. Weeks after Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, a group of interagency officials in the Biden administration met with outside arms-control experts to discuss the risk of small-arms proliferation in the conflict. According to Stohl, who attended one of the meetings, U.S. officials offered assurances about vetting Ukrainian security forces and addressing reports of unauthorized transfer — but scant details on how the vetting or monitoring happens. “It does not inspire much confidence,” said Stohl. Other arms experts feel similarly in the dark. “It is unclear what risk mitigation or monitoring steps the U.S. and other countries have taken, or what guarantees they have obtained, to ensure the protection of civilians through these very large transfers,” said Annie Shiel, a senior adviser at the Center for Civilians in Conflict. Some of the recommended steps include establishing a special investigator as the U.S. government did in Afghanistan, ensuring any weapons transfers contain strong tracking procedures, adding human rights obligations in the terms of sale and including specifics about what units can be authorized to receive such transfers. (In 2018, Congress banned Ukraine’s Azov battalion, a far-right nationalist group associated with neo-Nazism, from receiving U.S. weapons.) There are additional concerns among watchdog groups about arms proliferation stemming from Moscow amid reports it has enlisted mercenaries from Libya, Syria and Chechnya, as well as the Wagner Group, a Russian contractor. During a televised meeting of Russia’s Security Council in March, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said 16,000 volunteers in the Middle East stood ready to fight alongside Russian-backed forces in Eastern Ukraine. In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his approval, saying, “We need to give them what they want and help them get to the conflict zone.” At the same meeting, Shoigu proposed handing over captured U.S. Javelin and Stinger missiles to pro-Russian separatists in Donbas region. “Please do this,” Putin told Shoigu. The introduction of foreign fighters to a conflict runs the risks of weapons returning to those individuals’ countries of origin when the fighting in Ukraine ends. There are conflicting reports about the presence of foreign fighters there, however, and it’s unclear precisely how many have in fact traveled to Ukraine. The lack of information has spurred calls for answers from the administration and attention from Congress. “Some of the weapons being provided in the conflict in Ukraine are likely to be found years, and possibly decades later,” said Abramson. “Congressional leaders should be asking these questions, in classified briefings if needed, and the public should be better informed.”

#### That causes escalation of wars in the middle east.

Alaraby and Müller 20 [Muhammad Alaraby is a senior researcher at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina’s Center for Strategic Studies. He is also a fellow at the Cairo School for Liberal Sciences and Arts (CILAS), where he teaches future politics and philosophy of science. Alexander Müller is the Media and Events Coordinator at the Carnegie Middle East Center.; “Countering Illicit Arms Transfers In the MENA Region: the Case of Yemen and Libya”; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; MENA Peace & Security Project; October 2020; https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/16657.pdf]//eleanor

This policy paper aims to explore the new flows and trade of illicit arms across the MENA region that have created and continue to feed ongoing conflicts, most notably in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. This situation threatens the human and national security of the region’s nations. Combatting war economy activities in war-ridden countries will be a critical issue in the post-conflict context, and this pertains to countering small arms and light weaponry transfers that may reignite conflicts on both communal and ethnic levels. Examining illicit arms transfers in Libya and Yemen, the paper draws policy options that address the economic, social, and political aspects of this threat. Consequently, it will investigate the existing international legal framework and mechanisms employed by regional and international organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the UN, as well as how to fill the gap between them and the national authorities in charge of stemming out this threat. MAPPING OUT CONFLICT AND ARMS TRAFFICKING IN THE MENA REGION Legal arms and weaponry owned by the state and law enforcement are essential to peace and stability. Illicit arms transfer is key to enduring conflicts, social strife, and crime, notably terrorism. Illicit arms transfer or arms trafficking can be defined as those arms and weaponry possessed, stored, traded, and used in clear violation of national and/or international laws and without official government consent or control; these transfers may involve corrupt government officials acting on their own for personal gain (see Small Arms Survey definitions). Basically, non-state actors, whether they are terrorist organizations, militias, or criminal gangs, are the most relevant to the illicit arms transfer; nevertheless, states are major players in this trade since they are the main manufacturers and suppliers of illicit arms. For example, while the arms trafficking black market is dominated by criminal and trafficker groups, the illicit grey market arms transfer refers to deals done by governments, or their clients and agents, exploiting loopholes or intentionally circumventing national and international laws governing arms trade. By applying this understanding to illicit arms trade in the MENA region, this paper tends to focus on the implications of the arms proliferation of small arms and light weaponry (SALW) that refer to heavy machine-guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missiles and rocket systems, etc. Therefore, proliferation in this regard does not include the use of non-conventional arms such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, which are subject to a different non-proliferation set of policies. In the MENA region, illicit arms transfer is both a cause and effect of the unfolding armed conflicts that continue to rage on. While arms trafficking had been always around the corner before the Arab Uprisings in 2011, and mostly related to the state-softness and the states’ clientelist political structure, the disintegration of the Arab states in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya gave rise to illicit arms trafficking and other criminal activities. Moreover, the rise of violent non-state actors and their trans-border networks, and the intensification of the regional geopolitical rivalries, namely between Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt in addition to the EU and USA, turned the conflict into prolonged proxy wars where local and national warring parties are provided with arms and funds to gain political ground. Setting aside direct military intervention by some of these powers in the conflicts of the four war-ridden countries, these interventions were in violation of the UN-imposed embargo designed to disarm the national conflict parties, be it national parties such as the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Libyan National Army (LNA) in Libya, the Assad Regime in Syria, or terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda across the region. On the other hand, the proliferation of arms, especially SALW, is perpetuating conflicts in many ways. It sustains the power balance between conflicting parties; and it entrenches war economy activities, such as human trafficking, drugs, and goods allowing local criminal organizations to become armed to the teeth. Additionally, it deteriorates social stability since it fuels communal and social strife, especially in sectarian, tribal, or ethnic conflicts, which is an underlying cause for most of the Arab civil wars. For these socio-economic and political reasons, disarmament and arms control is integral to post-conflict stabilization and regional security.

#### That cauess Israel-Iran escalation – goes nuclear.

Teller 22 [Neville Teller has written about the Middle East for more than 30 years, has published five books on the subject; “Israel-Iran: Could The Proxy War Ignite? – OpEd”; Eurasia Review; May 13, 2022; https://www.eurasiareview.com/13052022-israel-iran-could-the-proxy-war-ignite-oped/]//eleanor

Of the many conflicts in the Middle East, the ongoing proxy war between Iran and Israel is potentially the most explosive. Built into the DNA of the Iranian Revolution from its start in 1979 was the aim of destroying Israel, as a preliminary step toward the destruction of Western democracy as exemplified by the US. In pursuit of this fundamental objective, Iran’s leaders have provided funding, weapons, and training to groups including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)) which have carried out attacks on Israel, and which have been designated terrorist organizations by many countries, Because Israel perceives the Iranian regime as a threat to its very existence, it has consistently opposed Iran’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. It seeks also to downgrade Iran’s allies and proxies, and prevent Iranian entrenchment in Syria, another sworn enemy of Israel. For years, Iran and Israel have engaged in a shadow war, quietly attacking each other –directly or by proxy – on land, by air and at sea. Escalation to all-out war has been deliberately avoided, and attacks usually remain either unattributed or plausibly denied. For example, the assassination of five Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2020 remains unexplained and unacknowledged, to say nothing of the series of mysterious explosions at various of Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2020. In April 2021, Iran blamed Israel and vowed revenge for an explosion at its largest uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, which it said caused significant damage to its centrifuges. It was the second time in less than a year that the site had been hit by a suspicious blast. Israel neither confirmed nor denied it was responsible for either attack. A cyber attack that paralyzed Iran’s gas stations nationwide on October 26, 2021, has also not been acknowledged. Backed heavily by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hezbollah’s military forces in Lebanon have, if the boasts of its leaders are to be believed, accrued a vast arsenal of rockets and missiles along the border. Israeli forces have repeatedly struck at Hezbollah’s rocket pipeline within Lebanon, and Hezbollah has on occasion retaliated by firing rockets into Israel and attacking Israeli troops along the border. As for Syria, ever since the civil conflict started in 2011 Iran has been strengthening its military presence in the country in support of Assad. Using its so-called “Shia Crescent” Iran transfers weaponry meant for Hezbollah through Iraq and Syria. In an effort to stop the arms flow and counter this second hostile presence on its northern border, Israel has conducted an increasingly open campaign of air strikes in Syria against the flow of weaponry and its storage. At sea, tit-for-tat attacks on commercial vessels in and around the Gulf of Hormuz began in 2019 – again with little by way of explanation for each incident. Since several targets have been Iranian tankers carrying oil towards Syria, media and the public have been left free to speculate. There is always a risk of this long-standing proxy war suddenly igniting into direct military conflict between Israel and Iran. Whether this nightmare scenario ever materializes turns on how Iran’s nuclear program emerges from the current negotiations in Vienna around reviving the nuclear deal. The administration of President Joe Biden seems dead set on concluding a new agreement which, all reports indicate, would delay but not eliminate Iran’s eventual acquisition of a nuclear military capability. Iran‘s leaders say they have no ambition to build nuclear weapons. The hoard of secret documents spirited out of Iran in 2018 suggests otherwise. In Washington on October 20, 2021 foreign minister Yair Lapid warned that Israel was prepared to use military force to stop Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capability. “Iran has publicly stated it wants to wipe us out,” said Lapid. “We have no intention of letting this happen.” Should force be required to stop an Iranian bomb, Israel would have to act, and almost certainly act alone. That is how the long-standing Israel-Iran proxy war could assume a terrible reality.

### 2NC Impact

#### It causes smaller conflicts to escalate.

Van Oosterom 15 [Karel van Oosterom is ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland since 2020.; “The human cost of illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons”; May 13, 2015; https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/documents/speeches/2015/05/13/statement-the-human-cost-of-illicit-transfer-destabilizing-accumulation-and-misuse-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons]//eleanor

Firstly, the human cost of the illicit trade, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons is tremendous. Illegal small arms and light weapons are, on a global scale, responsible for 90 per cent of all deaths during armed conflict and for 60 per cent of all violent deaths outside of armed conflict. This makes small arms and light weapons the most deadly weapons worldwide, thereby justifying their qualification as a ‘global public bad’. Moreover, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons increases the risk that both smaller and larger conflicts give rise to mass atrocities. As the Security Council acknowledged in Resolution 2117, the misuse of these weapons can result in grave crimes and can thereby pose a threat to international peace and security. In this respect, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would also like to underline the importance of the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

### 2NC Link

#### Increased arms to Ukraine risks lethal weapons ending up in the wrong hands

France24 22 – (“Experts warn arms for Ukraine could end up in wrong hands,” *France24*, 5-17-22, <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220517-experts-warn-arms-for-ukraine-could-end-up-in-wrong-hands>, Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)

Western countries have been ramping up weapons and ammunition shipments to Ukraine as Kyiv fights off a Russian invasion, but arms trade experts warn some of the lethal assistance **could end up falling into the wrong hands.** Ukraine in particular has a history as a hub of the arms trade during the 1990s, setting off alarm bells for those who study illicit flows. "There are very significant risks associated to the proliferation of weapons in Ukraine at the moment, in particular regarding small arms and light weapons," said Nils Duquet, a researcher and director of the Flemish Peace Institute. Western nations, above all the US, have announced successive shipments of both light and heavy weapons for Kyiv's forces since Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border on February 24. Washington alone has delivered or promised military gear including hundreds of Switchblade kamikaze drones, 7,000 assault rifles with 50 million rounds of ammunition, laser-guided missiles and radar systems to detect enemy drones and incoming artillery fire. "While the response to provide more weapons to Ukraine is understandable..., it would be prudent to consider the immediate and long-term security implications," the US-based Stimson Center think-tank said in March. "We’ve seen time and time again how arms aimed at aiding an ally in one conflict have found their way to the frontlines of unforeseen battlefields, **often in the hands of groups at odds with US interests or those of civilians**," it added, pointing especially to small arms. 'Overwhelming challenge' Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many weapons stockpiled in Ukraine were shipped off to other countries and conflict zones around the world. That looting of the country's arms supplies resumed following Russia's 2014 annexation of the Ukrainian Black Sea peninsula of Crimea and the seizure of two regions in the east of Ukraine by pro-Moscow separatists. According to the Small Arms Survey (SAS) by the Geneva-based Institute of International and Development Studies, 300,000 light weapons were stolen or lost between 2013 and 2015, with just 4,000 retrieved since then. Rather than being shipped abroad as in the 1990s, most of these ended up on the black market within Ukraine, the SAS found. "The unresolved conflict in the eastern part of the country and general anxiety towards local security conditions" could explain increased demand for weapons among ordinary people, SAS researcher Matt Schroeder said. Looking ahead, "collecting these weapons and disposing of them properly would be an overwhelming challenge for any government, let alone one that is still fighting an existential threat," he added. 'Bank robberies with Javelins' Even before the current conflict, the US military's inspector general in 2020 questioned the level of surveillance of weapons sent to Ukraine. Annie Shiel of the Center for Civilians in Conflict (Civic) warned that "there has been very little transparency around what risk mitigation or monitoring steps the US and other countries sending weapons to Ukraine have taken, if any... to ensure the protection of civilians". The aid group has called for deliveries to be tied to human rights commitments and for the arms to be tracked after they are handed over. Other experts see the task of following arms through conflict zones as all but impossible. "It's an illusion to think that in a context of war you can actually have control of weapons there. We know that many weapons will not return to the official forces but **they will remain in the region for many years,"** said Nils Duquet. "Look at Yugoslavia, success has been made but these weapons are still being smuggled in all parts of Europe," he added, predicting similar outcomes for Ukraine. One senior French military officer evoked a lurid possible outcome. "We'll be laughing on the other side of our faces once we're seeing bank robberies with Javelins," he said, referring to the US-made anti-tank missiles.

#### Nobody knows what happens to weapon shipments

Lillis et al. 22 - a CNN reporter covering intelligence and national security (Jeremy Herb is a national security reporter covering Congress for CNN Politics, Natasha Bertrand is a White House Reporter for CNN based in Washington, D.C., Oren Liebermann is a CNN Pentagon correspondent based in Washington DC., “What happens to weapons sent to Ukraine? The US doesn’t really know,” *CNN Politics*, 4-19-22, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/19/politics/us-weapons-ukraine-intelligence/index.html>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

The US has few ways to track the substantial supply of anti-tank, anti-aircraft and other weaponry it has sent across the border into Ukraine, sources tell CNN, a blind spot that’s due in large part to the lack of US boots on the ground in the country – and the easy portability of many of the smaller systems now pouring across the border. It’s a conscious risk the Biden administration is willing to take. In the short term, the US sees the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of equipment to be vital to the Ukrainians’ ability to hold off Moscow’s invasion. A senior defense official said Tuesday that it is “certainly the largest recent supply to a partner country in a conflict.” But the risk, both current US officials and defense analysts say, is that in the long term, **some of those weapons may wind up in the hands of other militaries and militias that the US did not intend to arm.** “We have fidelity for a short time, but when it enters the fog of war, we have almost zero,” said one source briefed on US intelligence. “It drops into a big black hole, and you have **almost no sense of it at all after a short period of time.”** In making the decision to send billions of dollars of weapons and equipment into Ukraine, the Biden administration factored in the risk that some of the shipments may ultimately end up in unexpected places, a defense official said. But right now, the official said, the administration views a failure to adequately arm Ukraine as a greater risk. Because the US military is not on the ground, the US and NATO are heavily reliant on information provided by Ukraine’s government. Privately, officials recognize that Ukraine has an incentive to give only information that will bolster their case for more aid, more arms and more diplomatic assistance. “It’s a war – everything they do and say publicly is designed to help them win the war. Every public statement is an information operation, every interview, every Zelensky appearance broadcast is an information operation,” said another source familiar with western intelligence. “It doesn’t mean they’re wrong to do it in any way.” For months, US and western officials have offered detailed accounts about what the West knows about the status of Russian forces inside Ukraine: how many casualties they’ve taken, their remaining combat power, their weapons stocks, what kinds of munitions they are using and where. But when it comes to Ukrainian forces, officials acknowledge that the West – including the US – has some information gaps. Western estimates of Ukrainian casualties are also foggy, according to two sources familiar with US and western intelligence. “It’s hard to track with nobody on the ground,” said one source familiar with the intelligence.

#### There is no information about where weapons end up

Lillis et al. 22 - a CNN reporter covering intelligence and national security (Jeremy Herb is a national security reporter covering Congress for CNN Politics, Natasha Bertrand is a White House Reporter for CNN based in Washington, D.C., Oren Liebermann is a CNN Pentagon correspondent based in Washington DC., “What happens to weapons sent to Ukraine? The US doesn’t really know,” *CNN Politics*, 4-19-22, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/19/politics/us-weapons-ukraine-intelligence/index.html>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

“I couldn’t tell you where they are in Ukraine and whether the Ukrainians are using them at this point,” a senior defense official told reporters last week. “They’re not telling us every round of ammunition they’re firing and who and at when. We may never know exactly to what degree they’ve using the Switchblades.” The Defense Department doesn’t earmark the weapons it sends for particular units, according to Pentagon press secretary John Kirby. Trucks loaded with pallets of arms provided by the Defense Department are picked up by Ukrainian armed forces – primarily in Poland – and then driven into Ukraine, Kirby said, “then it’s up to the Ukrainians to determine where they go and how they’re allocated inside their country.”

#### Weapons are likely to end up on the black market

Lillis et al. 22 - a CNN reporter covering intelligence and national security (Jeremy Herb is a national security reporter covering Congress for CNN Politics, Natasha Bertrand is a White House Reporter for CNN based in Washington, D.C., Oren Liebermann is a CNN Pentagon correspondent based in Washington DC., “What happens to weapons sent to Ukraine? The US doesn’t really know,” *CNN Politics*, 4-19-22, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/19/politics/us-weapons-ukraine-intelligence/index.html>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

Inevitably, some weapons ended up on the black market including anti-aircraft Stinger missiles, the same kind the US is now providing to Ukraine. The United States famously scrambled to recover Stingers after the Soviet war in Afghanistan. It wasn’t successful in finding all of them and when the US itself invaded Afghanistan in 2001, some officials feared that they could be used by the Taliban against the United States. Other weapons have ended up arming US adversaries. Much of what the US left behind to help Afghan forces **became part of the Taliban arsenal after the collapse of the Afghan government and military.** The problem is not unique to Afghanistan. Weapons sold to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates found their way into the hands of fighters linked to al-Qaeda and Iran. The risk of a similar scenario happening in Ukraine also exists, the defense official acknowledged. In 2020, the Defense Department inspector general released a report raising concerns about the end-use monitoring of weapons being sent to Ukraine.

#### Weapons have no oversight – increased lethal arms inevitably ends up in the illicit arms market

Nanda 22 - Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda has been commenting on Indian politics, foreign policy on strategic affairs for nearly three decades (Prakash, “‘Road To Hell’: As Ukraine Receives Huge Consignments Of Foreign Arms, Why It Could Spell Doom For Rest Of The World,” *The Eurasian Times*, 3-9-22, <https://eurasiantimes.com/road-to-hell-as-ukraine-receives-huge-consignments-of-foreign-arms/>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

But these stories overlook the danger or risk of illegal diversion that comes with issuing weapons with little to no oversight, something that the **Ukrainian government does not seem to realize**, despite the fact that the diversion of military-grade weapons such as hand grenades, rockets, and landmines has been a profitable business in Ukraine in recent years, giving the country a very bad name in the process. A Hub Of Illicit Arms According to the Global Organized Crime Index, apart from being a source of transit and destination point for human trafficking, Ukraine is one of the **largest arms trafficking markets,** with a substantial stockpile of weapons, few barriers to accessing arms and millions of small arms and light weapons on the black market. “While it has long been a key link in the global arms trade, its role has only intensified since the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Most arms are reportedly trafficked domestically, but the illicit arms trade is also linked to **criminal arms markets in Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and Turkey,** as well as countries in the EU and the former Yugoslavia,” the index points out. “Within Ukraine, the cities of Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Kyiv are significant logistical centers for criminal networks. The increasing number of arms combined with relatively limited controls and conflict in parts of eastern Ukraine has resulted in a sharp increase in the size of the criminal market for small arms and light weapons, particularly Makarov and Tokarev pistols, AK-pattern assault rifles, and Dragunov sniper rifles. “Additionally, there is a smaller market for light machine guns. Firearm seizures have been the largest in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where fighting has been the most intense. Conflict-affected areas constitute the major sources of illicit flows for the rest of the country.”

## Uniqueness CP

### 1NC Uniqueness CP

#### The United States federal government should end all military aid to Ukraine.

#### Solves DA uniqueness

Cancian 22 - Senior Adviser, International Security Program (Mark F., “U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine Accelerates,” *CSIS*, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-military-aid-ukraine-accelerates>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

The White House announced a new military aid package of $800 million on April 21, just five days after the previous $800 million aid package. The new package has many similarities to the earlier one described in a recent CSIS commentary: it expands U.S. support by including U.S. weapons, requires the United States to train Ukrainians in the use of these systems, and implicitly assumes a long war. The new aid package includes two new items: an increase in the overall rate of support and a mysterious custom-designed unmanned aerial vehicle.

## \*\*Lashout Uniqueness CP

### 1NC

#### The United States federal government should condition incremental sanctions relief and military aid to Ukraine on Russian agreement to end military engagement in Ukraine.

#### The CP gives Russia a way out AND solves the Ukraine war

Aghjeh 22 - doctoral candidate in History at the University of Vienna where he is working on U.S. diplomatic history and international affairs (Amin E., “How the West Can Pull Russia to the Negotiating Table,” *The National Interest*, 6-23-22, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-west-can-pull-russia-negotiating-table-203169>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Russia may also be incentivized to enter negotiations if it receives a pledge that incremental sanctions relief will follow its implementation of a negotiated peace deal with Ukraine. Another card that can be played by the West is NATO expansion into Sweden and Finland. The process of the two countries joining NATO has been stalled by Turkey’s opposition. Bringing Sweden and Finland into the alliance may have its pros and cons for the United States and its allies. On the one hand, adding two strong member states could strengthen the alliance. On the other hand, it will extend U.S. and allied commitments in Europe at a time when a bigger strategic challenge in Asia requires more resources and attention. But this issue aside, it would be hard to dispute that ending the war in Ukraine is not more important than Sweden and Finland joining NATO. Russia has long opposed Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO and will likely be willing to make concessions on Ukraine if their bid to join NATO seems imminent. Turkey may be willing to play nice if the resolution on the table could end the Ukraine war. After angering Russia by supplying effective Bayraktar TB-2 drones to Ukraine, Turkey returned to its policy of balancing between the West and Russia as soon as it became apparent that Ukraine is unlikely to fall. Turkey’s opposition to Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids should be seen primarily in this context. Inflation in Turkey recently hit a twenty-three-year high of 73.5 percent, and the war in Ukraine is doing even more harm to the Turkish economy. A recent survey shows that public support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has fallen to 26.5 percent, a near-historic low. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will certainly welcome a boost to the Turkish economy, especially given next year’s presidential and parliamentary elections.

### 2NC - Solvency

#### Sanctions are key to effective negotiation

Treisman 22 - a writer and editor for the Morning Edition live blog, which she helped launch in early 2021 (Rachel, “How sanctions factor into negotiations between Russia and Ukraine,” *npr*, 3-30-22, <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/30/1089630996/russia-sanctions>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

The U.S. and other western allies have unleashed a barrage of economic penalties on Russia in the weeks since it first invaded Ukraine. As the violence continues — and the two countries return to the negotiating table — how much are sanctions actually helping push Russia to end the war? Morning Edition's A Martínez posed that question to Juan Zarate, a former assistant secretary of the Treasury who is now global co-managing partner at K2 Integrity. Zarate says the sanctions have had a dramatic impact on the Russian economy when it comes to things like the value of the ruble and the selloff of bonds and assets, but are not enough on their own to turn back the tanks, especially when there's "a committed actor like [Russian President Vladimir Putin] with a design on invading a country and potentially destroying its cities. "Sanctions have a tail to them — they take time to take effect, the effects on the economy in Russia are still just being felt, and so I think it's asking sanctions to do too much to actually stop the war. But it certainly can be part of a tableau of pressure that's put on Putin to try to change his behavior, change his calculus," Zarate explains, pointing to other factors like the Ukrainian resistance, diplomatic isolation and companies pulling out of Russia. Sanctions can, however, **play an important role in the ongoing negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.** And Zarate says we may also see more action taken against sanctions evaders, and countries that are continuing to do business with Russia. How sanctions factor into negotiations Zarate says sanctions could play two important roles in the ongoing peace talks. For one, they help shape how Russia feels the costs of its actions, something he says should play into the calculus of negotiators at the bargaining table. In other words, he says, they should understand that things are only going to get worse for Russia as its economy continues to feel the effects of sanctions. The conversation could also come to **include the lifting of certain sanctions,** such as restrictions on trade or investment. "Every sanction that is used as a stick can also be used as a carrot," Zarate says, adding that he has seen this in the case of Iran and other countries that are seeking to get out from under the pressure of economic sanctions.

#### Sanctions are key to force Russia to the negotiating table BUT continued arms collapses negotiations

Acton 22 - holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (James, “To Support Zelensky, the United States Needs to Negotiate With Putin,” *Carnegie*, 3-10-22, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/10/to-support-zelensky-united-states-needs-to-negotiate-with-putin-pub-86612>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

“It’s not that I want to talk to Putin,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week about Russia’s president. “I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. **There is no other way to stop this war.”** The United States should heed this plea. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion has been both heroic and effective, but its situation is precarious. For all their flaws, Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict, and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government. Moreover, even if Ukraine can hold off Russian forces indefinitely, the prospect of forcibly evicting them from its territory—particularly in the south—is daunting. All the while, Russia is slaughtering Ukraine’s citizens ever more indiscriminately. But as Zelensky’s statement suggests, Ukraine’s plan to end this war is probably not to vanquish the invading forces. Rather, its goal appears to be to make the prospect of continuing the war, and the occupation that could follow it, exceptionally painful for Russia—so painful that Putin comes to view a settlement agreement that preserves Ukraine’s independence as the lesser of two evils. Putin may already be feeling the pain. The United States believes that Putin embarked on this war seeking to conquer most or all of Ukraine. Today, Moscow has implicitly recognized Zelensky’s government by demanding, in return for an end to the war, that Kyiv agree to Ukrainian neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. If Ukrainian forces continue to perform well, Putin will have to settle for still less and may even have to pay Ukraine reparations. (Conversely, if Russian forces achieve breakthroughs, Putin will be able to drive a harder bargain.) Even in the best case, if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement, he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. Any such concessions will probably be bitterly opposed by many in the United States and Europe. Ultimately, though, it is not their call. The democratically elected government of Ukraine should get to decide what price it is willing to pay for an end to the slaughter of its citizens and the preservation of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state. The United States and its allies should support Zelensky in any diplomatic course he pursues. Indeed, he cannot end the war without them. Economic sanctions on Russia **strengthen his hand at the negotiating table** by raising the costs to Russia of continuing to fight. By the same token, however, it is virtually inconceivable that Russia would agree to a settlement without sanctions relief. For this reason, the United States and its allies must be prepared to lift sanctions—including on Russia’s central bank—if Russia and Ukraine negotiate and implement a settlement agreement. To date, the United States and its allies have sent out mixed messages about sanctions relief. U.S. Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland indicated an openness to it. By contrast, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire has declared “economic and financial war on Russia” with the goal of causing “the collapse of the Russian economy.” In a similar vein, British Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss stated that “the purpose of the sanctions is to debilitate the Russian economy.” This ambiguity is dangerous because it risks obscuring the existence of an off-ramp for Putin and could thus prolong the conflict and increase the small but real chance of nuclear escalation. U.S. President Joe Biden should clear up the confusion by **stating publicly that the purpose of sanctions is to end the war**, not to remove the government of Russia. In coordination with Kyiv, he should dispatch a trusted lieutenant—such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken or CIA Director William Burns—to try to negotiate with Russia. Washington and its allies could also explore whether they could address Russian security concerns, and vice versa, through the **implementation of reciprocal arms control measures**—as the United States and NATO proposed in January. Success in this endeavor would be far from guaranteed, and the Biden administration would take heat for even trying. This criticism, however, could be undercut by Zelensky’s stating publicly that he would support sanctions relief for Russia in return for the implementation of any agreement he negotiated.

#### Diplomatic settlement succeeds now – failure causes US-Russia war

Robinson 22 - an English-American journalist, political commentator, and editor-in-chief of Current Affairs magazine (Nathan J., “The Idiotic Logic That Will Lead To Nuclear War,” *Current Affairs*, 5-22-22, <https://www.currentaffairs.org/2022/05/the-idiotic-logic-that-will-lead-to-nuclear-war>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

We must avoid nuclear wars, and we can. A diplomatic settlement in Ukraine is feasible **especially now that Russia has been defeated**. But it requires U.S. officials to be committed to statesmanship and shed bizarre delusions about Russia cannibalizing the world unless its military is destroyed beyond repair. World War I showed that world leaders who think themselves perfectly reasonable can in fact lead millions to their deaths in total needless catastrophes. We have not yet seen the end of “crackpot realist” ideology—the mentality that presents itself as pragmatic and realistic while in fact agitating for the insanity of war as the solution to problems. The existence of op-eds like Romney’s should alarm every person who values the continued existence of human civilization. Instead of treating nuclear conflict as an unthinkable horror and focusing on steps to ensure that it never, ever happens, Romney thinks we should be making plans, and simply reassures us that things definitely won’t end in catastrophe, even though we would be depending on the (clearly delusional and violent) Vladimir Putin to act with caution and restraint. There is no need for a U.S.-Russia war to happen, but if one does come about, it will be because there are political elites in this country who do not understand the reality of war and **accept no responsibility for actions that might exacerbate conflict**. They peddle silly myths about Putin as a world-dominating Hitler type (he is more like George W. Bush, as even George W. Bush recently hinted). These people are dangerous and should not be published in mainstream newspapers.

## Lashout Turn

### 1NC – Negotiated Settlement

#### Either side could win the war now BUT it’ll be close – the aff ensures a crushing defeat for Russia which spurs Putin lashout

Latham 22 - a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington, D.C (Andrew, “The folly of humiliating Russia,” *The Hill*, 5-25-22, <https://thehill.com/opinion/3501660-the-folly-of-humiliating-russia/>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Calls that nothing short of a “true defeat” be visited on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s are growing in both frequency and intensity. And nowhere is this on more prominent display than in Anne Applebaum’s recent Atlantic piece calling for a victory over Russia that is rapid, comprehensive (involving military defeat, economic pain and even some type of NATO membership for Ukraine) and, above all, humiliating. According to Applebaum, only such a profound and profoundly humiliating defeat will permanently chasten Russia. Only such a true defeat will “force the reckoning that should have happened in the 1990s…. the moment when Russians should have realized the folly of Moscow’s imperial overreach, when they should have figured out why so many of their neighbors hate and fear them.” Only such a true defeat, she avers, will end the historical pattern of Russian aggression and bring about permanent peace on its periphery. But while it might be emotionally gratifying to issue such calls, and even to fantasize about inflicting terrible pain on such obvious malefactors, the goal of inflicting such a defeat on Russia **must not become allowed to become policy**. For if history teaches us anything relevant to the current conflict, it is that inflicting such a defeat would most definitely not have the salutary effect on international security that its advocates assume. Indeed, quite the opposite. Inflicting a comprehensive and humiliating defeat on Russia would be **far more likely to set the stage for further discord**, conflict and war on Europe’s eastern marches than to usher in an era of regional peace and tranquility. To put it bluntly, indulging fantasies of inflicting near-total defeat on Russia would be a terrible mistake — one that we can, and must, avoid making. To understand why inflicting a devastating defeat on Russia would be such a terrible mistake, it is necessary to pay attention to a motivating factor that is often overlooked or minimized in conventional accounts of foreign policy and grand strategy: **humiliation**. Most theories of international relations, of course, tend to assume rational actors, either anthropomorphized states or actual state officials seeking to rationally advance or defend the state’s national interest. While not entirely blind to “non-rational” factors in individual or collective decisionmaking, these approaches tend to systematically **downplay or ignore the role of emotion** in shaping the foreign policies of states. But, as Clausewitz cautioned us long ago, emotions in general (or the passions, as he called them) can and do play an important role in foreign policy, especially when it comes to war. And as Joslyn Barnhart argues in her recent book “The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics,” historically, the specific emotion of “humiliation” has proven to be a major driver of foreign policy – especially the kind of revanchist and revisionist foreign policy that all too often leads to war. Barnhart’s compelling argument begins with a definition: Humiliation “is a complex and negative self-conscious emotion, which combines the sense that one has been mistreated with a painful sense of self-doubt and helplessness in the face of this injustice.” It is the substrate for “national humiliation,” which “arises when individuals who identify as members of the state experience humiliation as the overwhelming emotional response to an international event.” National humiliation occurs, Barnhart further argues, either when a state suffers “rapid defeat to a state with lesser military capability” or when it has “been unfairly undermined by ill-intended others.” Either way, such humiliation involves a “loss of status or prestige which they [policy makers] believe has undeservedly threatened the state’s image on the world stage.” Finally, Barnhart shows how humiliated states have historically attempted to overcome their humiliation and restore their status and prestige by engaging in “the use of force against the state responsible for one’s humiliation or against third-party states that were not involved in the original humiliating event.” Although Barnhart’s book was published before Russia reinvaded Ukraine earlier this year, its implications for today’s Russo-Ukraine war are perhaps obvious. Indeed, it doesn’t take much imagination to see how inflicting a devastating defeat on Russia of the kind Applebaum advocates would both humiliate the country’s leaders and incentivize them to take whatever steps they deem necessary – **up to and including starting another war** – to overcome this humiliation. The strategic implications of this are perhaps obvious. As Barnhart notes in her conclusion, prudent policy that seeks to minimize both the humiliation of defeated states and all of the undesirable consequences of such humiliation should “avoid the codification of inferiority within formal and informal treaties and negotiations.” They should avoid, in other words, imposing punitive treaties and settlements that formalize inferiority or that seek to diminish the defeated nation’s status or standing beyond some unavoidable minimum. In the absence of a 1945-scale total victory by one side or the other (which is obviously not in the cards), this suggests that the goal now should be a **negotiated settlement** that leaves both Russia and Ukraine (a) exhausted, (b) relatively satisfied and (c) as little humiliated as possible.

#### That causes nuclear war

Sanger et al. 22 - a White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer (David E., Eric Schmitt is a senior correspondent covering national security for The New York Times, Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter for The New York Times covering the intelligence agencies, “Washington’s Newest Worry: The Dangers of Cornering Putin,” *The Washington Post*, 3-3-22, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/us/politics/biden-putin-sanctions.html>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

Senior White House officials designing the strategy to confront Russia have begun quietly debating a new concern: that the avalanche of sanctions directed at Moscow, which have gained speed faster than they imagined, is cornering President Vladimir V. Putin and **may prompt him to lash o**ut, perhaps expanding the conflict beyond Ukraine. In Situation Room meetings in recent days, the issue has come up repeatedly, according to three officials. Mr. Putin’s tendency, American intelligence officials have told the White House and Congress, is to **double down when he feels trapped by his own overreach**. So they have described a series of possible reactions, ranging from indiscriminate shelling of Ukrainian cities to compensate for the early mistakes made by his invading force, to cyberattacks directed at the American financial system, to more nuclear threats and perhaps **moves to take the war beyond Ukraine’s borders**. The debate over Mr. Putin’s next moves is linked to an urgent re-examination by intelligence agencies of the Russian leader’s mental state, and whether his ambitions and appetite for risk have been altered by two years of Covid isolation. Those concerns accelerated after Mr. Putin’s order on Sunday to place the country’s strategic nuclear weapons on a “combat ready” alert to **respond to the West’s “aggressive comments.”** (In the ensuing days, however, national security officials say they have seen little evidence on the ground that Russia’s nuclear forces have actually moved to a different state of readiness.)

### 1NC - Russia Loss Bad

#### Russian loss in Ukraine causes nuclear lash out AND an emboldened China

Fix and Kimmage 22 - a Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, in Washington, D.C, Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Liana and Michael, “What If Russia Loses?,” *Foreign Affaris*, 3-4-22, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-03-04/what-if-russia-loses>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

The consequences of a Russian loss in Ukraine would present Europe and the United States with fundamental challenges. Assuming Russia will be forced to withdraw one day, rebuilding Ukraine, with the political goal of welcoming it into the EU and NATO, will be a task of Herculean proportions. And the West must not fail Ukraine again. Alternatively, a weak form of Russian control over Ukraine could mean a fractured, destabilized area of continuous fighting with limited or no governance structures just east of NATO’s border. The humanitarian catastrophe would be unlike anything Europe has seen in decades. No less worrisome is the prospect of a **weakened and humiliated Russia**, harboring revanchist impulses akin to those that festered in Germany after World War I. If Putin maintains his grip on power, Russia will become a pariah state, a rogue superpower with a chastened conventional military but with its nuclear arsenal intact. The guilt and stain of the Ukraine war will stay with Russian politics for decades; rare is the country that profits from a lost war. The futility of the costs spent on a lost war, the human toll, and the geopolitical decline will define the course of Russia and Russian foreign policy for many years to come, and it will be very difficult to imagine a liberal Russia emerging after the horrors of this war. Even if Putin loses his grip on Russia, the country is unlikely to emerge as a pro-Western democracy. It could split apart, especially in the North Caucasus. Or it could become a **nuclear-armed military dictatorship.** Policymakers would not be wrong to hope for a better Russia and for the time when a post-Putin Russia could be genuinely integrated into Europe; they should do what they can to enable this eventuality, even as they resist Putin’s war. They would be foolish, however, not to prepare for darker possibilities. History has shown that it is immensely difficult to build a stable international order with a revanchist, humiliated power near its center, especially one of the size and weight of Russia. To do so, the West would have to adopt an approach of continuous isolation and containment. Keeping Russia down and the United States in would become the priority for Europe in such a scenario, as Europe will have to bear the main burden of managing an isolated Russia after a lost war in Ukraine; Washington, for its part, would want to finally focus on China. China, in turn, could try to strengthen its influence over a weakened Russia—leading to exactly the kind of bloc-building and Chinese dominance the West wanted to prevent at the beginning of the 2020s.

#### Even a small Ukrainian victory guarantees nuclear response

Fix and Kimmage 22 - Program Director in the International Affairs Department of the Körber Foundation and was previously a Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Liana and Michael, “What If Ukraine Wins?,” *Foreign Affairs*, Accessed 6-1-22, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-06/what-if-ukraine-wins>, LASA-AH)

Another risk is that even a small Ukrainian victory might be **preceded or followed by nuclear threats from Putin**. Putin has departed from Cold War precedent by instrumentalizing nuclear weapons for political reasons rather than just for ones related to national security. His menacing statements have come across as bluster. But Putin could up the ante. To scare his adversaries, he could order technical preparations for the **potential use of nuclear weapons**. The West should react to such threats with deterrence, signaling clearly that Putin would achieve nothing through the use of nuclear weapons. If that does not work, and Putin acts on his threats, then NATO should consider carrying out a limited conventional response, either against Russian forces in Ukraine or within Russia itself. In the meantime, the West needs to build a broad coalition to condemn and deter nuclear saber rattling by linking sanctions and threats of retaliation to Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship. China might not join in, but out of fear of nuclear instability, it might approve of the idea. Finally, even if Ukraine wins small, Kyiv and its partners would have to prepare for years of continued conflict. Zelensky has indicated as much by saying that postwar Ukraine will resemble Israel in its full-time orientation toward self-defense. Putin, meanwhile, would continue to probe for Western vulnerabilities: much as he responded to Western sanctions in 2014 by meddling in the U.S. presidential election in 2016, he would likely mix cyberattacks, disinformation, and “active measures,” such as operations that would damage political parties and leaders Russia dislikes, undermine the internal stability of “anti-Russian” countries, and degrade the integrity of the transatlantic alliance and similar such alliances in the Indo-Pacific. The West would be forced to contain Russia for the foreseeable future. After all, the West can do little to influence Russia from within other than to hope for the emergence of less combative Russian leadership.

### Link - General

#### Increased militarization forces Putin into a corner – he resorts to chemical and nuclear escalation

Gongloff 22 - a Bloomberg Opinion editor and writer of the Opinion Today newsletter (Mark, “A Losing, Humiliated Putin Is the Most Dangerous Putin,” *Bloomberg*, 4-28-22, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-04-28/putin-losing-the-ukraine-war-is-likely-to-lash-out-use-nukes>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

**Beware the Cornered Putin** Many people and organizations, from cereal companies to Hogwarts houses, have animal mascots meant to represent their core values. Sometimes they’re almost too revealing. For example, the animal with which Vladimir Putin has publicly identified is the cornered rat. Not to be confused with Pizza Rat, which is just trying to bring dinner home on the subway, or Scabby the Rat, which is just trying to helpfully point out non-union workers, Cornered Rat is the most dangerous rat of all, because it will attack unexpectedly to escape. Putin is cornered in Ukraine, where no amount of war crimes have been able to break the will of a nation he expected to subjugate two months ago. Andreas Kluth sees hints Putin is now looking for new ways to attack. Cutting off gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria is one. A string of mysterious explosions in Moldova hints at another, darker avenue. And **if he gets truly desperate, he has plenty of chemical and nuclear weapons.** In a sense, the West is playing a game of chicken to see how much it can damage Russia’s economy and war machine, along with Putin’s standing at home, **without triggering a nightmarish response**. Russia, deprived of Western goods, must revert to being the starved autarky that made living in the Soviet Union such a pleasant experience, writes Leonid Bershidsky. Unfortunately for the Russian people, the only way to enforce it will be full-on fascism. It’s worth remembering that a young Putin escaped from the cornered rat that impressed him so much by attacking him. We should be so lucky.

#### Increased arms to Ukraine puts more pressure on Putin to respond - miscalc

Friesdersdorf 22 - staff writer at The Atlantic and the author of the Up for Debate newsletter (Conor, “What Happens When We Back Putin Into a Corner,” *The Atlantic*, 3-2-22, <https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2022/03/what-happens-when-we-back-putin-into-a-corner/623882/>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Cornering Vladimir Putin In The Spectator, Harry J. Kazianis warns that backing Putin into a corner **could result in the use of nuclear weapons:** If both sides can’t come to a deal, Putin may decide to truly go all in against Kyiv, determining that a scorched earth policy and **winning at any cost** is better than taking weeks or months to take the country in full. The level of carnage we would see would be something akin to images from World War II: bombed-out cities, bodies on the streets, and total carnage everywhere. The world would be horrified—and would demand action against Russia. What would the West do? It’s likely that more weapons would flow into Ukraine on a grand scale, putting more pressure on Putin to respond. More sanctions would then follow, including disconnecting all of Russia’s banks and financial institutions from SWIFT, including entities tied to Russian energy, the lifeblood of Moscow’s economy. At that point, Russia’s way of life, its ability to exist, would be threatened. The Putin regime would be threatened. What, oh, what would Moscow do then? Think “escalate to deescalate”—and that could mean something horrible for all of us. Citing similar concerns, National Review editorializes that **Putin should be given some way to avoid complete humiliation:** There is a danger that Putin—trapped and risking a humiliating defeat—will choose a desperate escalation, threatening the West with **nuclear blackmail** or saber-rattling on the border of a NATO country. The United States must stand firm and support our allies, but we must also look for ways that might allow Putin to back down while retaining some semblance of face.

#### Militarizing Ukraine forces escalation – only minute concessions solve

Carugati 22 - a master’s student in International Studies at Laval University. Passionate about strategic studies, he works as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Paquin (Rémy, “Ukraine: Why NATO Must Make Concessions,” *Network for Strategic Assistance*, 1-24-22, <https://ras-nsa.ca/ukraine-why-nato-must-make-concessions/>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Defusing a Russian intervention and getting out of this crisis implies pressuring Ukraine to implement the constitutional reforms necessary to grant autonomy and amnesty to the Donbas republics. These separatist republics have significant support from the local population and are backed by a major power. They have thousands of civil servants, especially soldiers, who are more determined to fight – and die – than NATO. Ultimately, the main driver of Russian-Western tensions is Ukraine. Kyiv’s desire to join NATO is in direct opposition to Russia’s conception of national and territorial security. Russia is ready to fight to secure its interests, as are the Ukrainians. However, Ukrainians have no real chance of winning against Russia without Western support. The Atlantic Alliance **lacks the cohesion and interest to pay the costs associated with real support for Ukraine**. The current half-support is insufficient to deter Russia, and it even **encourages a Russian intervention to stop Ukraine’s steady military modernization.** To truly deter Russia, NATO would have to provide assets and endure costs that its members do not want to bear. This is why implementing a strategy that corresponds to NATO’s accurate means and interests would help to avoid crisis escalation. And such strategy entails convincing Moscow that a legal way out exists in the Donbas by reorienting Western pressure from Moscow to Kyiv.

#### US military support causes Russian insecurity – prompts lashout

Carugati 22 - a master’s student in International Studies at Laval University. Passionate about strategic studies, he works as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Paquin (Rémy, “Ukraine: Why NATO Must Make Concessions,” *Network for Strategic Assistance*, 1-24-22, <https://ras-nsa.ca/ukraine-why-nato-must-make-concessions/>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Western Support to Ukraine Russian current tenseness is in direct reaction to continuous Western support of Ukraine forces fighting Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions – collectively known as the Donbas. NATO’s support to Kyiv is channeled through the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. Since 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea and destabilization in Eastern Ukraine, NATO’s goal has been to increase capacity building and provide military training to allow Ukrainian forces to resist Russian-backed militias in the Donbas. The Biden administration has equipped Ukraine with arms and military equipment totaling $650 million in the last fiscal year alone. The U.K. signed a Memorandum of Implementation on naval contracts with Kyiv in 2021, while the U.S. signed a Strategic Defense Framework and a Charter on Strategic Partnership with Ukraine. 200 Canadian soldiers are deployed in Ukraine as part of Operation Unifier, and Ottawa has provided $700 million worth of aid to Ukrainian forces since 2014. As part of broader efforts to augment its deterrence posture following the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has increased its deployments in the Black Sea (naval and air patrols) and reinforced the Alliance’s forward presence in Eastern and Southern Europe. More recently, France has declared it would send troops to Romania as part of NATO’s “Enhanced Advanced Presence” missions. A strengthening of NATO’s military posture can also be seen in the Baltic countries and Eastern Europe. Russia’s Grievances and Resolve **All of this triggers great security concerns in Russia.** Putin is suspicious of NATO’s defensive rhetoric, notably because of NATO’s interventions in Kosovo and Libya and its post-Cold War Eastern European expansion. For Russia, **U.S. support to Ukraine equates to a de facto integration of Ukraine** – short of the article 5 provision – in NATO. U.S.’ stated willingness to increase interoperability between Ukraine and NATO is unacceptable for Moscow, for security and ideological reasons. Ukraine’s insistence on joining NATO and NATO’s firm support of its Open-Door policy (article 10) is at the core of Russian grievances against the West. There is no way the Kremlin will ever allow Ukraine to move forward with its ambition of joining NATO, nor will NATO ever fight to help Ukraine do so.

### Link - Prolonged War

#### Sending arms to Ukraine only prolongs the war – bogs down Putin

Daly 22 - an Irish politician and a member of the European Parliament (Clare, “Throwing in more arms to Ukraine will only escalate war with more Ukrainians dying: MEP,” *Global Times*, 4-21-22, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202204/1259925.shtml>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

GT: You recently tweeted that "anyone demanding the EU pumps Ukraine full of lethal weapons should read it carefully. **It is not as simple as you think**." Could you please elaborate on the stance? Daly: My position will be similar on the situation in any conflict area - sending more arms into a war can only result in prolonging that war. It's not that I don't believe that Ukrainians have the right to defend themselves. They do. But the reality is that over the past period, there has been a growing militarization in Ukraine. The EU throwing in more arms **will not be sufficient to defeat the Russian army**. It will only lead to the war being prolonged, and more Ukrainians dying. And worryingly, those arms are being distributed to people and organizations **without any checks or balances**. So god only knows where those weapons will end up and when, in years to come, they will come to be used in other situations. So, it's a very dangerous tactic. I know some of the people in Europe who are calling for this, believe that they are doing this out of the desire to protect the Ukrainian people. People would like to help innocent Ukrainians, as I would. But sending more arms in is not going to do that. The only solution is a negotiated peace settlement.

#### Continued war increases the likelihood of escalation

Walters 22 - Journalist specializing in business, politics, energy markets and Russia (Greg, “Putin’s ‘Cornered Rat’ Story Might Be a Warning About His Next Move,” *Vice News*, 3-1-22, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/v7dxax/the-new-russia-anxiety-what-putin-might-do-if-he-feels-cornered>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

Dangerous hubris Putin appears to have dramatically overestimated Russia’s ability to quickly smash Ukrainian resistance, analysts said. None of Ukraine’s major cities have fallen, defying even Western expectations. Unprecedented sanctions have torpedoed Russia’s national currency and its stock market, and sent Russian citizens scrambling to join long lines at ATMs. Ukrainian resistance has proven much stiffer than seemingly anyone expected. Now, Putin seems to have few good options to resolve the conflict without losing face, analysts said. **Simply backing down now could be perilous for him.** The Kremlin strongman has spent two decades building a reputation as Russia’s all-powerful, irreplaceable leader, and racking up a string of swift military victories along the way. Russian forces have engaged in protracted, brutal military campaigns in Syria and in the Russian region of Chechnya, that killed thousands of civilians. Russian soldiers and leaders may balk at deploying similar tactics against Ukrainians, who have strong historic and linguistic ties to Russians. But at the same time, a humiliating climb-down in Ukraine could have implications for Putin’s future grip on power, Kremlin-watchers said. Russia would be left saddled with devastating sanctions and cornered in political isolation, with nothing to show for it. “If he throws in the towel and says, ‘My bad, we messed up,’ that **takes the veneer off his image as Putin-the-mastermind,”** said Joshua Tucker, director of New York University’s Jordan Center for Advanced Study of Russia. The crisis in Ukraine is already creating fissures in Russian society. Over the weekend, two of Russia’s richest and most loyal oligarchs openly called for peace in Ukraine, a rare sign of defiance among the country’s ultra-wealthy elite. Over 6,400 people have been arrested in anti-war protests in dozens of cities around Russia, according to OVD-Info, an independent group that tracks the arrests. Putin seems, for now, to have placed himself in a strategic position with few good options to resolve the conflict. Russia has publicly demanded concessions including ceding the region of Crimea to Russia, and the demilitarization of Ukraine. Yet as the assault has bogged down, the possibility that Ukraine would concede such demands appears increasingly remote, analysts said. Continuing with the assault will likewise carry steep costs for Russia. Western powers still have room to ratchet up the sanctions regime even further. And more casualties will only increase Russian domestic unrest over the conflict, analysts said. Even a conventional military victory by Russia using overwhelming force, which many experts believe Russia can still achieve, would create the possibility of a grinding guerrilla war for the foreseeable future. Putin has also raised long-dormant anxieties about Russia’s nuclear capabilities by putting the country’s nuclear forces on “high alert,” prompting nerve-wracking conversations about the possibility of nuclear war that not long ago would have been considered outlandish. Such talk is prompting Western officials to look for ways to provide Putin with some kind of acceptable offramp. President Joe Biden’s White House says it doesn’t want to overreact to Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. But it remains unclear whether Putin would find any Western proposals for deescalation acceptable. Like the big rat he once chased down a corridor in Leningrad, Putin may decide the best way out of a terrible situation is to **ratchet up tensions even further.** “The question becomes, which is the bigger fear: The fear that he’ll look weak if he walks it back, or the fear that the situation for Russia will get much worse if he steps it up? That’s what makes this a dangerous moment,” Tucker said.

#### More weapons escalates the conflict

Scahill 22 - a Senior Correspondent and Editor-at-Large at The Intercept (Jeremy, “U.S. and NATO’s Unprecedented Weapons Transfers to Ukraine Could Prolong the War,” *The Intercept*, 3-10-22, <https://theintercept.com/2022/03/10/ukraine-russia-nato-weapons/>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

The substantially expanded and expedited Western arms shipments, and increased intelligence support, **could prolong large-scale military action.** NATO has also said that any Russian attack against the supply lines facilitating the flow of weapons to Ukraine will trigger an invocation of Article 5 of the NATO charter, thus raising the specter of military action against Russia. Moscow, which has already labeled the sweeping sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies a declaration of “economic war,” has warned that nations sending weapons to Ukraine “**will be responsible for any consequences of such actions.”** The weapons will surely aid Ukrainian forces in waging counterattacks against Moscow’s invasion but will not be sufficient to defeat Russia militarily. Should Moscow succeed in forcibly taking major Ukrainian cities or even in toppling the government, the Western weapons are likely to be used in a **protracted armed insurgency** and war of attrition that may produce echoes of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

### AT: Concessions

#### Russia won’t go beyond Ukraine

Finnis 22 – Reporter (Alex, “Will Russia stop at Ukraine? What Putin wants from the invasion and how likely he is to attack other countries,” *iNews*, 3-1-22, <https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russia-will-stop-ukraine-what-putin-want-invasion-how-likely-attack-other-countries-1491685>, Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

Could Russia invade other countries? Russia has not stated any intentions to push beyond Ukraine, but Moscow also previously said it would not invade Ukraine, so a further invasion is certainly not impossible. Any further drive **would be incredibly risky for Russia**, particularly if its forces enter a Nato state. Nato uses a system of collective security, whereby its independent member states agree to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party. That means if Russia were to invade, say Poland, Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia, it would automatically be at war with the US, UK and all 30 Nato members, and while Russia’s forces are strong they would be dwarfed by Nato’s collective power.

#### Russia won’t keep expanding – Ukraine’s culturally unique AND its economy can’t support another invasion

Carugati 22 - a master’s student in International Studies at Laval University. Passionate about strategic studies, he works as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Paquin (Rémy, “Ukraine: Why NATO Must Make Concessions,” *Network for Strategic Assistance*, 1-24-22, <https://ras-nsa.ca/ukraine-why-nato-must-make-concessions/>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

What would be Russia’s next steps if NATO accommodates it in Eastern Ukraine? It is **unlikely that Russia would keep expanding** if the Ukrainian crisis were resolved on terms that Moscow could live with. First, because Russia’s economy would endure massive costs to sustain the war effort just to hold Kyiv, not to mention other holds in Russia’s near-abroad. The maximum-pressure scenario – Russia’s exclusion from the global economy – would make it near impossible for Russia to finance expansionist policies in the long run, not to mention the local resistance Russia would face. Furthermore, Russia has **high stakes in protecting the status of the Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine**. The Ukrainization of Russian minority areas in Ukraine, and Kyiv’s indigenous law excluding Russian minorities (as well as Ukrainian), directly affects Russia’s identity as the protector of Russian minorities. This Russian emotional involvement favors Russian irredentism in Eastern Ukraine and militates against the idea that Russia contemplates expansionist aims. Ukraine’s ideational importance to Russia plays a significant part in motivating Russia’s revisionist policy towards Ukraine. Moscow ideational interests elsewhere in the post-Soviet sphere are not as salient as they are in Ukraine. Therefore, Russian expansion is unlikely, as not all land is equally valuable from an emotional (and security) standpoint.

#### Capacity – the Ukrainian invasion has already failed and Russia doesn’t have the capacity to expand further BUT pushing him too far causes irrational escalation

Robinson 22 - an English-American journalist, political commentator, and editor-in-chief of Current Affairs magazine (Nathan J., “The Idiotic Logic That Will Lead To Nuclear War,” *Current Affairs*, 5-22-22, <https://www.currentaffairs.org/2022/05/the-idiotic-logic-that-will-lead-to-nuclear-war>, Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Romney disagrees. Note that he does not argue against the proposition that present U.S. actions (massively escalating military support for Ukraine and getting closer to a “proxy war” while declining to push for a diplomatic settlement) make a nuclear response from Russia more likely. Instead, he appears to argue that it doesn’t matter that this makes Putin more likely to use a nuclear weapon, because the alternative would be “paying the cannibal to eat us last” and would mean that Putin can “invade and subjugate with near impunity.” Some may find this persuasive, thinking a diplomatic settlement would reward Russian aggression and encourage it to invade countries in the future. But **this narrative is false**. As foreign relations expert Anatol Lieven explained in a recent Current Affairs interview, it overlooks the crucial fact that Russia has already lost the war. Russia failed in its objective, which was to topple and replace the Ukrainian government. Russia has not even secured full control of the Donbas. Russia has suffered immense losses of troops, had its economy wrecked, become a pariah state, strengthened Ukraine as a nation, strengthened NATO, and shown its military to be a paper tiger that cannot even conquer territories within a few miles of its own border. This is a critically important fact to understand. A diplomatic settlement now would not result in a “victory” for Russia that encourages further invasions. Russia has proven that it is utterly and completely incapable of invasions. It cannot even conquer a poor country like Ukraine. **It is not going to invade Finland. It is not going to invade the United States**. Russia has shown that it is not, in fact, any kind of serious threat. Romney portrays Russia as a kind ravenous cannibal that, if not stopped, will devour the entire world. Since Russia cannot even devour the Donbas, this is an utterly deranged fantasy. It is pure fearmongering. Once we understand that Russia has already suffered a defeat, and has already been strongly disincentivized from pursuing future invasions, it becomes clear how insane it would be at this point to take steps that could make Russia more likely to use nuclear weapons. With the **aggression having failed to pay off,** what we need is to facilitate a deal between Ukraine and Russia that both parties can accept. Since Putin is likely secretly eager to find a way to end this calamity for his country without being completely humiliated or losing power, such a deal (basic details of which have been outlined by Lieven and Chomsky) should be within reach. Or, on the other hand, we could push Putin as far as possible in order to maximally punish him, knowing that at any point this irrational, violent, delusional man has a weapon in his back pocket that could lead to the end of the world. We would, of course, as Romney says, be doing this in the name of “freedom,” even though it could result in the gruesome deaths of millions. They would be dead, and Ukraine would be a radioactive wasteland, but at least Putin would have been taught a lesson.

## Terrorism Turn

### 1NC Terrorism Turn

#### Reducing the cost and increasing the abundance of precision-guided munitions causes it to fall into the hands of terrorists.

Itamar Lifshitz 11-17-2020, fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, "The Paradox of Precision: Nonstate Actors and Precision-Guided Weapons", War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/the-paradox-of-precision-nonstate-actors-and-precision-guided-weapons/, DL

On Feb. 16, 2016, the secretary general of Lebanese Hizballah, Hassan Nasrallah, declared that “a missile on these ammonia plants [in Haifa] is equal to an atomic bomb.” This implicit threat to attack Israeli chemical plants with precision munitions demonstrates the paradox of precision: Weapons that allow traditional militaries to reduce collateral damage can be used by nonstate actors to target critical infrastructure and threaten civilians.

Precision-guided systems and standoff capabilities have become abundant and cheap. As a result, these systems are proliferating into the hands of nonstate actors who easily evade the legal norms surrounding their use. Existing arms control and legal frameworks fail to define and address the unique and severe threats posed by the transfer of precision standoff capabilities and technologies to nonstate actors, as they are focused primarily on denying proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. An explicit norm banning these transfers would help states tackle a growing security threat, through regulation and interdiction, and would also reduce the international legitimacy of the proliferation of precision standoff technologies.

#### They’re a game changer. Escalates global terrorism and Mexican cartel fighting, and causes Middle East war.

Itamar Lifshitz 11-17-2020, fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, "The Paradox of Precision: Nonstate Actors and Precision-Guided Weapons", War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/the-paradox-of-precision-nonstate-actors-and-precision-guided-weapons/, DL

Nonstate actors are increasingly using precision weapons systems. The destructive effects of this trend are not theoretical. This is evident almost anywhere one looks in the Middle East. In Lebanon, Hizballah is investing heavily in making its vast ballistic arsenal more sophisticated and precise, including efforts to acquire the necessary manufacturing capability and know-how. In Yemen, Houthi rebels have used armed drones to target Saudi oil infrastructure. The abundance of precise systems is not exclusively an outcome of Iranian-backed proliferation — the Islamic State has also used weaponized drones on multiple occasions in Iraq and Syria.

This phenomenon is by no means confined to the Middle East. Surface-to-air missiles launched from pro-Russian separatist-controlled territory in the Donbass shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. There have been reports of Boko Haram using attack drones in Nigeria. Simultaneously, across the globe, criminal organizations are beginning to harness aerial capabilities. The adoption of drones for violent uses has apparently already begun in the war between Mexican drug cartels.

Using precision technology and standoff capabilities, nonstate actors can cause more damage now than in the past. These technologies are readily available, cost less, do more, and require less expertise. Standoff capabilities challenge the ability to retaliate and to eliminate threats in real time. Some of these systems are being transferred by increasingly persistent “rogue” proliferators, but others are a part of the so-called “support” given by global and regional powers to local actors. As the threshold for the acquisition and use of technologies such as unmanned aerial systems, drones, and quadcopters has been significantly lowered, nonstate actors are also innovatively weaponizing commercially available technologies.

In the coming years, as technology for precision-guided systems continues to advance, the challenges are likely to increase. First, these systems are sure to become more lethal — nonstate actors will have more precise weapon systems, with bigger payloads and more of them. Secondly, the ability to deploy these systems will improve significantly and they may be increasingly autonomous. Operating these systems from longer ranges will become easier, and the use of predetermined GPS targets (or other Global Navigation Satellite Systems) or AI algorithms could reduce the role of humans in the decision-making process. The use of space-related commercial intelligence gathering platforms, such as Google Earth, helps different entities to easily acquire precise targets. These new technologies might also simplify the use of nonconventional weapons, as, for example, a drone or quadcopter could easily disperse chemical agents.

## Various Advantage CPs

### Hotlines CP

#### The United States federal government should establish a national defense hotline with [x].

#### That solves.

Walker 21 – Leah Walker is a future digital security fellow at the Institute for Security and Technology. (Leah Walker, "Zoom Won’t Stop a Nuclear War," Foreign Policy, 4-19-2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/19/zoom-hotline-red-telephone-nuclear-war-cuban-missile-crisis/, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

As nuclear-armed states seek to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict in a new era of multipolar great-power competition, rethinking hotlines should be at the top of their agenda. In many ways, this is low-hanging fruit that could serve as the technical catalyst for expanded trust and dialogue. Indeed, France, as the new chair of the P5 Process, has embraced the concept of “strategic risk reduction” and will make improving crisis communication technologies like hotlines a key priority for discussion among the United Nations Security Council’s permanent five members ahead of and beyond the planned Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty this August.

In turn, various governmental and nongovernmental voices have made broad proposals for nuclear-weapons states to consider whether they are serious about improving the security environment. For example, the 16 countries participating in the Stockholm Initiative have identified a list of “stepping stones” toward nuclear disarmament, which includes improving hotlines. At the same time, another coalition of 12 countries that form the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has also included the need for crisis-proof communication lines in its “landing zones,” or areas of potential agreement, to reduce nuclear risks. The Global Enterprise to Strengthen Non-Proliferation and Disarmament has also pointed out that communications links between nuclear weapons states “are not universal, and those that do exist warrant review.”

Our organizations—the Institute for Security and Technology and the European Leadership Network—are looking at nuclear weapon decision-making in the face of technological complexity. In particular, the Institute for Security and Technology team has closely examined global nuclear command, control, and communications systems and outlined what an innovative global hotline—dubbed “Catalink”—could look like. This project has gone beyond the conceptual stage and is ready for evaluation by the nuclear-armed states. Such an evaluation could be undertaken without change to their policies, postures, or arsenals, and it would feature well into their effort to take a more strategic approach to nuclear risk reduction while tensions rise in conflict zones across the globe.

Given the very real risks of nuclear escalation through misinterpretation of rhetoric or actions, or the miscalculation of responses due to ambiguity and secrecy, leaders must have the ability to speak clearly, confidently, and confidentially.

Maintaining stability and preventing nuclear use in an unstable multipolar world that includes nine nuclear-armed states is impossible using the bipolar logic and inadequate systems of the Cold War. Modern, robustly encrypted, and survivable multilateral communication systems available to nuclear decision-makers are needed to face the perils of the 21st-century nuclear reality. Hotlines are due for an urgent upgrade.

## T

### 1NC---T-Semi-Autonomus

#### Violation. PGMs are semi-autonomous.

Heather Roff 1-16-2015, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford Department of Politics and International Relations and Research Scientist at the Global Security Initiative, "Autonomous or 'Semi' Autonomous Weapons? A Distinction Without Difference", HuffPost, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/autonomous-or-semi-autono\_b\_6487268, DL

We have roughly four functions on a weapons system: trigger, targeting, navigation, and mobility. We might think of these functions like a menu that we can order from. Semi-autonomous weapons have at least one, if not three, of these functions. For instance, we might say that the Samsung SGR-1 has an "autonomous" targeting function (through heat and motion detectors), but is incapable of navigation, mobility or triggering, as it is a sentry-bot mounted on a defensive perimeter. Likewise, we would say that precision guided munitions are also semi-autonomous, for they have autonomous mobility, triggering, and in some cases navigation, while the targeting is done through a preselected set of coordinates or through "painting" a target through laser guidance.

### 2NC---Violation

#### PGMs and AI are distinct.

John R. Hoehn 6-1-2021, Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs, "Precision-Guided Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress", Congressional Research Service, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45996.pdf, DL

Emerging factors that may affect PGM programs. Another potential issue for Congress is how DOD’s programs for developing and procuring PGMs might be affected by emerging factors such as

 the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty;96

 new U.S. military operational concepts for countering Chinese A2/AD forces in the Indo-Pacific region, such as the Army’s new Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) operational concept and the Marine Corps’ new Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, both of which possibly feature the potential use of such weapons from island locations in the Pacific as a way of countering China’s A2/AD forces; and

 emerging technologies such as hypersonics and artificial intelligence (AI). 97